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NOTES
TRUST SHARES AND THE NOMINEE PROBLEM IN NEW YoRIC*
A DILEMA has long faced trustees of estates which embrace stock cer-
tificates as part of their assets. On one hand, the rules of the New York
Stock Exchange proscribe as invalid the consummation of a sale by delivery
of certificates registered in the name of a trustee.' On the other, the issuance
of new certificates in the name of another, purchaser or broker, in order to
comply with Exchange rules, entails delays which make impossible the effi-
cient administration of stock portfolios on a fluctuating market.2 These delays
are the inevitable product of the common law rule which requires the issuing
corporation to investigate the trustee's authority to make the transfer in
question, on penalty of being designated a participant in the breach of trust
should the transfer be unauthorized.3 To protect the issuing corporation from
the liability imposed under this doctrine, its transfer agent customarily con-
sumes the better part of a week in a thorough investigation of both the status
of the trustee and the scope of his powers.4 During this period, the favorable
market position of the certificates concerned may well be sacrificed.
In order to avoid this dilemma, it has been the custom of corporate trustees,
at the inception of the trust, to transfer securities included in the estate into
the name of a nominee,5 typically a dummy partnership set tip by the officers
of the trust department. The sole function of the nominee is to buy, hold,
and sell trust securities in accordance with the rules of the Stock Exchange.
Even though nominee holding renders a trust estate liquid by avoiding the
necessity of the tedious process of re-registration of the trust-held securities,
it violates one of the many common law strictures governing the conduct of
trustees, the requirement that the trust fund be "earmarked".0 The courts,
* Estate of Harris, N. Y. L. J., May 3, 1938, p. 2136, col. 3.
1. N. Y. Srocit ExcHAGc.E DIRETORY AND GuIE (1938) Rule FP-36, U E-1l.
2. "Under present day conditions fiduciaries of all kinds, in their dealings with
securities, must be in a position not merely to act, but to act quickly." N. Y. LAW R.vI-
SION Co fMIssiox, LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENT (1937) No. 65 (I) 7.
3. There is a split of authority as to whether the liability of the corporation rests
upon (1) participation in the fiduciary's breach of trust [Marbury v. Ehlen, 72 Md. 206,
210, 19 AtI. 648, 651 (1890); 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusTEEs (1935) § 902; Scott.
Participation in a Breacli of Trust (1921) 34 HARv. L. Rzv. 454, 465], or (2) the breach
of a duty owed to stockholders to prevent unauthorized transfers [Geyser-Marion Gold-
Min. Co. v. Stark, 106 Fed. 558 (C. C. A. 8th, 1901); Baker v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry.,
173 N. C. 365, 92 S. E. 17& (1917) ; 12 FLETCHER, CoRPoRATION s (perm. ed. 1932) § 5546;
Note (1927) 56 A. L. R, 11991. In the leading case Taney, J., based liability upon the
corporation's trustee relationship to the stockholder. Lowry v. Bank, 15 Fed. Cas. No.
8,581 (C. C. Md., 1848).
4. See CHRISTY, TRANSFER OF STocK (1929) § 209-10.
5. N. Y. LAw REVISION CozamtIssioN, LzG SLATIVE DocuMENT (1937) No. 65 (I) 7.
6. In re Gerken's Will, 142 Misc. 271, 254 N. Y. Supp. 494 (1931); In re Grub's
Will, 160 Misc. 718, 290 N. Y. Supp. 711 (1936); Matter of Harbeck, 142 Misc. 57,
254 N. Y. Supp. 312 (1931); Estate of McManus, N. Y. L. J., May 25, 1932, p. 2940,
col. 3; 3 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 3, § 596.
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however, have long recognized a privilege in the settlor to empower his trustee
to act beyond the bounds of the common law restrictions on fiduciaries.7 The
exercise of this privilege has been encouraged by corporate trustees,8 with
the result that about seventy per cent of all testamentary trusts and almost
all inter vivos trusts now executed expressly authorize the trustee to hold
the securities in the name of a nominee.
The Surrogate's Court of New York has watched this growing practice
of nominee holding with misgiving.0 The common law requirement that
assets of a trust be segregated has been codified in New York as to testa-
mentary trusts since 1916.10 Violation of the statute constitutes a misde-
meanor. Despite dicta assailing the wisdom of such practices, 1 New York
trust companies have persisted in the use of nominees apparently on the
assumption that the terms of the statute would be interpreted similarly to
the common law requirement as being directory and not mandatory and,
consequently, not invalidating the express permission of the settlor to employ
the nominee device.12 This assumption has proven erroneous. In a recent
7. "Every testator, by the law of the land, is at liberty to adopt his own non-
sense in disposing of his property.' Boulle v. Tompkins, 5 Redf. Surr. 472, 478 (N. Y.,
1882). See 3 BOGERT, Op. cit. supra note 3, § 590; REsATEIMENT, TrnusTs (1935) § 179,
comment d; IDDLE, THE INvESTMENTi-r POLICy OF TRusT I STiTUTroNs (1934) 62.
8. The tendency to give the corporate trustee wider investment powers, including
authorization to commingle the trust fund, has been noted in RIDDLE, op. cit. stipra note 7,
at 284. Trust forms recommended by corporate trustees commonly include the nominee
clause. STEPHENSON, DISCRETIONARY POWERS OF TRuSTEES UNDER WILLS AND AGnEE-
MEM'S (1937) § 8; ABBEY, HANDBOOK OF WILL AND TnRST FORMS (1936) form 347 (1);
6 BoGERT, op. cit. supra note 3, § 1189 (8). But see GtApRNT TRUST CO., SPZCI!MEN
Fo ms (1929).
9. In a speech before Officers and Counsel of the Banks and Trust Companies of
Westchester County, June 18, 1930, Surrogate Slater assailed such clauses as "vicious
and tricky.' Brief for Executors, p.9, Matter of Harris, N. Y. L. J. May 3, 1938, p.
2136, col. 3. Letter to YALE LAw JOuRNAL from James N. Vaughan, secretary to Surro-
gate Delehanty, Sept. 26, 1938.
10. N. Y. SUPROGATE'S CouRT Acr § 231. "That such mas the rule of law even prior to
its statutory enactment is indicated by the language of Surrogate Foley in Matter of
Early's Estate, 112 Misc. 54, 182 N. Y. Supp. 537 (1920)." Matter of Harb-clr, 142
Misc. 57, 66, 254 N.Y. Supp. 312, 321 (1931).
11. "In my opinion such a provision should never be inserted in a trust deed, and
I desire to call the attention of those members of the Bar who may participate in the
drafting of trust deeds of this nature to the inadvisability of permitting the insertion
of such a provision." Gerard, referee, in City Bank Farmers' Trust v. Burton, X. Y.
L. J., Oct. 6, 1932, p. 1341, col. 3; Estate of McManus, N. Y. L. J., ' May 25, 1932, p.
2940, col. 3.
12. Many zealously guarded common law limitations upon the trustee's powers have
been avoided by provisions in the will. In re Balfe's Will, 245 App. Div. 22, 230 N. Y.
Supp. 128 (1935) (permitting "self-dealing"); Crabb v. Young, 92 N. Y. 56 (1833)
(reducing trustees standard of care); In re Mann's Will, 251 App. Div. 739, 295 N. Y.
Supp. 71 (1937) (general "exoneration" clause); Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co., 2.0
Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 3d, 1918) (saving trustee immune for acts of agent) ; In re Robbins
Will, 135 Misc. 220, 237 N. Y. Supp. 409 (1929) ; In re Clark's Will, 257 N. Y. 132,
177 N. E. 397 (1931) (removing statutory restraints on investment). Vaiving of the
"earmarking" requirement was recognized in RESTATmETFr, TrsTs § 179(d).
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decision, Surrogate Delahanty, adamantly refusing to sanction the institu-
tional pattern of trust administration, ruled that the public policy embodied
in the statute' 3 contravened even an express authorization of nominee-hold-
ing by the settlor. By this decision he has placed practically every New
York trust company in the position of law-breaker.
The wisdom of the ruling seems questionable. The statute is the result of
a common law doctrine evolved to meet the dangers presented by an indi-
vidual acting as trustee.14 These dangers would seem to be minimized by
the present-day predominance of the corporate trustee.", The erstwhile possi-
bility that a nominee might improperly dispose of certificates to a bona fide
purchaser and leave the cestui with an empty remedy against a judgment-
proof individual trustee is obviated by the presence of a stable corporate
trustee subject to both state'0 and federal inspection 17 in the administration
of its funds. In addition, there seems small danger that the nominee of a
corporate trustee can successfully dupe third persons into extending credit
on a pledge of the trust owned but unlabelled certificates. The nominee's
function as alter ego of the trust company is too well known in the financial
districts. Moreover, although the stocks are registered in the name of a
nominee, physical segregation of the type that suffices in the case of bearer
bonds is achieved by keeping the certificates owned by each estate in the
separate portfolio of that estate. Stock may be removed only on order of
the trust officers and upon removal must be replaced by an "out slip" showing
trust ownership.' 8 From a functional viewpoint the prohibition against
nominee holding may well have outlived its utility. For this reason it is,
perhaps, regrettable that the court ignored the possibility of construing the
statute as directory and, consequently, applicable only to those testamentary
trustees whose empowering instruments are silent on the score of nominee
holding. In this way the court might have preserved the settlor's common
law privilege of choosing between the doubtful security of the prohibition
against nominee holding and the income potentialities of an estate made liquid
by the nominee device. Such a construction would have been in line with
the parallel common law doctrines.' 0
It was noted by the court that no injury had been occasioned the estate
by the trustee's actions, and, therefore, no liability was imposed upon the
13. Section 125 of the N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW, enacted to curb the potential
menace of almost unlimited powers drafted into wills by corporate fiduciaries, makes
no mention of the nominee clause while declaring certain others to be contrary to pub-
lic policy.
14. 3 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 3, § 596.
15. Trust institutions, three-fourths of which have come into existence since 1900,
now are responsible for assets estimated as high as 37 billion dollars. SMITu, TRUST
COMPANIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1928) Ch. III; Goss, Billions in Personal Trust
Funds, BARRON'S, March 6, 1933.
16. N. Y. BANKING LAW, §§ 122, 39.
17. 13 STAT. 116 (1864), 12 U. S. C. § 481 (1934).
18. Information gathered by a representative of the YALE LAW JOURNAL in inter-
views with trust officers of seven New York trust companies.
19. See notes 7 and 12, supra.
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fiduciary for breach of its trust. This adheres to the recently developed
doctrine that a trustee can be made to respond in damages only if a causal
relationship can be established between the decreased value of the estate and
the violation of the nominee prohibition.20 As a result, the danger of sur-
charge is removed as a serious deterrent to continuation of the condemned
practice, since nominee holding per sc would seem incapable of causing a
drop in the value of the securities so held. Other sanctions exist, however,
by which the courts may prevent continued violation of the statute. An
offending trustee may be removed from office, 2 denied his fees,- and even
subjected to a penal fine and/or imprisonment.23 Consequently, testamentary
trustees would be well advised to re-transfer nominee-held certificates into
their names as trustees.24 If a trust company is resigned to the administra-
tion of assets frozen by the necessity of a week's delay in transfer, it still
should be careful to avoid a technical breach of the provision that "all trans-
actions had and done by him shall be in his name as . . . testamentary
trustee."25 To accomplish a desired sale on the Exchange without violation
of this mandate, the trustee may hold the certificates until they have been
registered in the former nominee's name, and then have the former nominee
effect a purchase by delivery from the trustee and a sale on the Exchange
at the same point of time.20
This procedure is by no means obligatory, since there are two possible
methods, other than the nominee device, by which a trustee may obtain quick
liquidity for trust held stocks. In the first place, transfer agents of the issu-
ing corporations might be persuaded to reduce the scope of their investigations
20. The former rule was that if a trustee breached the earmarking requirement he
was liable to the cestuis for any decrease in the value of the estate during his breach
regardless of the cause of the decline in value. Mitchell v. Moore, 95 U. S. 587 (1877) ;
In re Gerken's Will, 142 Misc. 271, 254 N. Y. Supp. 494 (1931). More recent decisions
tend to hold a trustee who has acted in good faitl for only those losses w.hich seem to
be directly connected with his failure to disclose his trustee status. In re Guthrie's
Estate, 320 Pa. 530, 182 Ati. 248 (1936) ; Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust Co. V. First
Unitarian Society, 200 N. E. 541 (Mlass. 1936); Chapter House Circle of the Kings
Daughters v. Hartford Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 121 Conn. 558, 186 At. 543 (1935),
(1936) 46 YALE L. J. 322.
21. fatter of Grossman, 157 Misc. 164, 283 N. Y. Supp. 323 (1935). Violation of
statutory prohibitions of § 231 elicited summary removal from trusteeship notwithstand-
ing absence of bad faith.
22. Commissions were denied an executrix who had deposited trust funds in her own
name. Matter of Hutkoff, 124 'Misc. 703, 209 N. Y. Supp. 588 (1925).
23. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1937 limits punishment for a misdemeanor to one year's
imprisonment and/or five hundred dollars' fine. That such criminal penalties might bz
imposed upon corporate fiduciaries, guilty of the technical misdemeanor of "nominee
holding," is highly tenuous in view of the institutional acceptance of the practice.
24. Interviews with officers of seven representative trust companies reveal that only
two are retransferring trust securities into estate names. Five are postponing action
of any kind until the outcome of an appeal or legislative decision on "nominee holding."
25. N. Y. SUaoGA-E's COURT AcT § 231.
26. Such coterminous negotiations are possible under rules of the Exchange which
give from two to four days for the settlement of "regular way" sales. NEw YoaK STocK
EXCHANGE DIREcIoRY AND GUIDE (1938) C-503.
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in order to effect transfers within a day's time instead of the customary week,
thereby enabling the trustee to sell on the Exchange and produce the trans-
ferred certificate on settlement day. Such a change in transfer procedure
is made feasible by recent New York legislation obviating the necessity of
an inquiry into the trustee's powers by permitting the corporation to assume
the transfer to be within the terms of the instrument unless it has positive
knowledge to the contrary.27 In those few instances where the transfer agent
and the trustee are different departments of the same bank, the statute may
be robbed of its effect by the imputation of the trust department's knowledge
of the terms of the instrument to the transfer department and, consequently,
to its principal, the issuing corporation. Moreover, there is a possibility that
the New York statute will not protect corporations domiciled in states lacking
similar legislation.2 8 Since the corporate trustees themselves act only after a
thorough legal investigation of their transfer power, they might, without exces-
sive danger, clear this barrier by indemnifying the issuing corporation from
possible liability arising from the fiduciary's breach of trust. This procedure,
however, might well fail to satisfy the issuing corporation, since there is a
strong possibility that the indemnity bond would be idtra vires and unenforce-
able. The untested features of this plan would seem to make more desirable
another alternative, that of effecting trust sales on the Exchange by use of the
short sale device.20 Borrowed certificates would be used to meet settlement day,
and the trustee would have ample time to transfer the trust-owned shares
into the name of the lender to repay the loan. Regulations pursuant to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 subject short selling to a margin require-
ment"0 and a prohibition which, in effect, prevents a short sale on a steadily
declining market.31 But this latter restriction would not hamper the trustee
since, though he sells "short," brokers may dominate this sale "long" by
virtue of the privilege granted by the S.E.C. to one "who owns the securities
sold and intends to deliver as soon as possible without undue inconvenience or
expense." 32
27. N. Y. GEN. Bus. LAW (Supp. 1937) § 359 i-i-k.
28. 4 BoaEwT, op. cit. supra note 3, § 902 n. 19; Comment (1938) 48 YALE L. 3.
92.
29. S. E. C. Regulations X-3B-3; 135 C. C. H. Stock Exchange Regulation Serv.
5405 (1938).
30. It is doubtful that such trustee sales are "short sales" within the marginal
requirements of section 7 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act 1934, 135 C. C. H. Stock
Exchange Reg. Serv. 111 140, 5455-1,2 (1938). But even were they "short sales" no col-
lateral would be necessary to effect such sales so long as the purchase price plus the
securities which are in the course of transfer were held by the broker, under section
3 (d-3) of Regulation T of the Federal Reserve Regulations, 135 C. C. 14. Stock Ex-
change Reg. Serv. 115455-3 (1938).
31. S. E. C. Regulations X-10A-1; 135 C. C. H. Stock Exchange Regulation Scrv.
II.5406(a) (1938) (prohibiting short sales at or below the price of the last "regular
way" sale).
32. Securities may be loaned to effect such a "long" sale under a similar exception.




Although this method provides liquidity as well as the security which the
surrogate demands, it offers to the trustee none of the administrative savings
of the bloc-dealing nominee method. To the trust estate it affords less diver-
sification, because of the increase in transfer costs involved in registering
every security in the name of a particular trust.3 3 The ability to handle
many trust funds as a single unit and to spread the holdings within each
estate without regard to transfer costs has been a major factor in contem-
porary extension of the trust device to the settlor of a moderate estate.3 4 These
advantages would seem to outweigh the danger of misapplication of the trust
estate, minimized as it is by the size and continual auditing of the New York
trustees.35 Consequently, the best solution to the problem would seem to be
legislation similar to the Uniform Trust Act.30 Such legislation would recog-
nize and except from the prohibitions of Section 231 practices which have
provided so little danger to cestuis as to warrant their acceptance as insti-
tutional.
DEPORTATION OF ALIEN FOR 2NMEMBERSHIP IN THE COMM NIST PARTY
WHENEVER a fear psychology born of depression or wartime fervor grips
the nation, emotional tension is likely to be released at the expense of alien
radicals. During the Red Scare of 1918, Congress passed a statute pro-
viding for the deportation of any alien who believed in or advocated, or
who at any time since his entry had been affiliated with any organization
that believed in or advocated, the overthrow of the United States Govern-
ment by force or violence.' The purpose of this legislation was to prevent
the spread of vicious propaganda by foreign agents and to expel persons
considered by Congress unfit for citizenship.2 Since the Red Scare, prose-
33. Transfer costs must be assessed upon each estate for each sale of securities held
in the name of that estate. Under nominee holding the transfer costs are negligible,
occurring but once when the settlor's own securities are put into the name of the nominee.
This will perforce lead to larger, less varied holdings in individual portfolios.
34. As of June 30, 1931, the individual trusts handled by national banks averaged
$49,319, but trusts of less than $25,000 occurred most frequently. See Barclay, Com-
mingled Funds Offer Broader Scope for Trust Service (1931) 53 TRusT Co. 615. Clif-
ford, Comnigled Trust Funds (1933) 11 HAv. Bus. Rv. 253.
35. Brief for Executors, p. 12; Brief of Special Guardian (memorandum in support of
objections) pp. 1, 2, 3. Estate of Harris, N. Y. L. J. May 3, 1938, p. 2136, col. 3.
36. HANDiRooK OF THE NATio.AL CONFERENCE oF COMMssIoNERs oN UxnIoF.
STATE LAWs AND PROCEDURE (1937) 265; UNIFOR TRUSTs AcT (1937) § 9.
*Strecker v. Kessler, 95 F. (2d) 976 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938), certiorari grantcd, Oct. 17,
1938, 6 U. S. L WEEK 152.
1. 40 STAT. 1012 (1918) § 1-3 as amended by 41 STAT. 1008 (1920), 8 U. S. C.
137.
2. See Ex parte Pettine, 259 Fed. 733, 735 (D. Mass. 1919). It is interesting to
note that a recent statute requires the registration of agents whose activities are those
of public relations counsel or publicity agent for a foreign principal. Political parties
subsidized from abroad must also register. Pub. L. No. 583, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.
(June 8, 1938).
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cutions under this statute have inversely reflected the economic cycle, dwin-
dling during the boom twenties, but ieviving steadily with the decline of pros-
perity.3
A recent decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 4 marks an abrupt
change in judicial interpretation of the deportation statute. Joseph Strecker,
an alien resident of Arkansas who entered the United States in 1912, was
ordered deported in 1934, a year after he filed a petition of naturalization,
solely on the charge of past membership in an organization which allegedly
advocated the overthrow of the United States Government. His member-
ship in the Communist Party for a period of three months was the only
evidence supporting the order.5 As proof that this organization was pro-
scribed, the Department of Labor introduced two items: his membership
book, and a copy of an official magazine, "The Communist,", published
over a year after Strecker's withdrawal from the party. Claiming that the
findings were unsupported by the evidence," Strecker obtained judicial re-
view8 upon application for habeas corpus.9 The Federal District Court
3. The following table roughly illustrates the trend:








For annual statistics, see CLARK, DEPORTATION OF ALIENS FROM THE UNITM STATES
To EUROPE (1931) 225n; ANNUAL REPORT, COMmISSIONER-GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION
(1932) 164; ANNUAL REPORT, SECRETARY" OF LABOR (1937) 89.
4. Strecker v. Kessler, 95 F. (2d) 976 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
5. The court refused to give any weight to the evidence of Strecker's personal
advocacy of the overthrow of the United States Government. The only evidence of
such a personal belief was Strecker's answer to a question which the court termed
"foolish." See Strecker v. Kessler, 95 F. (2d) 976, 977 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
6. "A magazine of the theory and practices of Marxism and Leninism, publishcd
monthly by the Communist Party in the United States of America." Strecker v. Kessler,
95 F. (2d) 976, 977 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
7. Strecker's additional claim of an unfair hearing was dismissed with a single
sentence: "We find nothing unfair about the hearings; as deportation hearings go, they
were conducted with ordinary fairness." For discussions of the deportation process, see
CHAFE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1920) 232-293; CLAGHORN, THE IMMIGRANT'S DAY IN
COURT (1923) 306-334; CLARK, DEPORTATION OF ALIENS FrOM THE UNITED STATES TO
EUROPE (1931); KING, DEPORTATIONS (memorandum published by American Civil Lib-
erties Union, 1936) ; VAN VLFCK, THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF ALIENS (1932) ;
Comment (1931) 31 CoL. L. REv. 1013; (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 380; (1928) 41 UARV,
L. REv. 522.
8. Since the statute does not provide for a trial de novo in the courts, the finality
of the deportation order may only be challenged by an attempt to obtain a writ of habeas
corpus. See 39 STAT. 889 (1917) § 19, 8 U.S.C. § 155; Nishimura Ekiu v. United
States, 142 U. S. 651, 660 (1892); cf. Fafalios v. Doak, 50 F. (2d) 640 (App. D. C.
1931) (bill in equity for cancellation of deportation order dismissed) ; Kabadian v. Doak,
65 F. (2d) 202 (App. D. C. 1933) (writ of prohibition denied) ; Rash v. Zurbrick, 6 F.
denied the application, but the Circuit Court of Appeals, in a vigorous
opinion by Judge Hutcheson, held that mere membership in the Communist
Party was no basis for deportation, and that the meagre evidence intro-
duced by the Labor Department was insufficient to place the party under
the statutory ban. Contrary decisions of other circuits10 were distinguished
as having been based upon the record of the party when, flushed with the
success of the Russian Revolution, it advocated violence. Instead, the court
recognized that the party's present policy of seeking to "proletarianize" the
United States by political means had supplanted the old doctrine of force.
In order to expel an alien because of his affiliation with an undesirable
group, the Labor Department is required to find not only the fact of mem-
bership, but also that the particular organization advocates or believes in
the violent overthrow of the United States Government. 1 Ordinarily no
difficulty is encountered in sustaining the burden of proving an alien's mem-
bership in the Communist Party, 2 for he is usually apprehended at a party
meeting and consequently either confesses or has his membership card on
his person.13 If no evidence can be adduced to establish present party affilia-
tion, proof of past membership is considered sufficient.14 Since the proceed-
ing is not criminal, 1 the alien is entitled to no protection against self-incrim-
ination3 6 If he refuses to answer any questions, an unfavorable inference
Supp. 390 (E. D. Mich. 1934) (injunction refused) ; In re Ban, 21 F. (2d) 1009 (W. D.
N. Y. 1927) (writ of certiorari denied).
9. In such proceedings the courts refuse to weigh the proof and will uphold the
finding if it is supported by "sufficient evidence." Tisi v. Tod, 264 U. S. 131 (1924) ;
Lewis v. Prick, 233 U. S. 291 (1914). However, tle requirements which the evidence
must satisfy have been variously stated. See VAN VN.acf, op. cit. supro note 7, at 194;
cf. CLAaic, op. cit. supra note 7, at 321; STEPHENS, Aam'siStTivE Trdunt",%Ls ,AD THE
RULES OF EVIDENCE (1933) 91.
10. For a collection of many of these cases, see (1938) 6 I. J. A. BuLL 135; Oppen-
heimer, Recent Developments in the Deportation Process (1938) 36 MINcu. L. REv. 355,
374 n.
11. Where the right to deport is based upon conduct subsequent to entry, the bur-
den of proof remains upon the government to overcome a presumption of innocence.
United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S. 149 (1923); Hughes v. Tropello,
296 Fed. 306 (C. C. A. 3d, 1924).
12. The burden of proving membership in a proscribed organization is upon the
government. Werrman v. Perk-ins, 79 F. (2d) 467 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935).
13. Membership in the Communist Party w%-as held to have been proved where the
alien had never attended any party meetings, had signed no application blank, had paid
no dues, and did not believe in the violent overthrow of the Government. Ex porte
Jurgans, 17 F. (2d) 507 (D. Minn. 1927), aff'd sub nom. Jurgans v. Seaman, 25 F. (2d)
35 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928). But cf. United States ex rel. Kettunen v. Reimer, 79 F. (2d)
315 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
14. The alien's past membership in the Commnist Party, fron which he had kcen
expelled, was held to be a violation of the statute. United States ex rel. Yokinen v.
Commissioner of Immigration, 57 F. (2d) 707 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), cert. denicd, 287
U. S. 607 (1932). But see Petition of Brooks, 5 F. (2d) 238, 240 (D. Mass. 1925).
15. See Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585, 591 (1913); Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U. S. 698, 730 (1893).
16. Loufakis v. United States, 81 F. (2d) 966 (C. C. A. 3d, 1936). A timely asser-
tion of this defense may protect the alien in states having criminal syndicalist statutes.
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may be weighed as evidence. 1 7 Even hearsay testimony that an alien was a
member of, or affiliated with, the party at any time since entry has been
regarded as evidence of membership.' 8 Once actual membership is proved
to the satisfaction of the court,19 an alien's protests that he did not know the
nefarious purposes of the party,20 or that he disagreed with its views, would
be unavailing.2 '
Prior to the Strecker case, the government was not seriously strained by
its burden of proving that the Communist Party was proscribed by the de-
portation statute. Some courts, "with a kind of Pecksniffian righteousness," 2
either took specific judicial notice that the Communist Party advocated or
believed in the violent overthrow of government, 23 or indirectly achieved
the same result by upholding warrants of deportation without discussing
either the alleged beliefs of the Party or any evidence which supposedly jus-
tified its proscription.24 Other courts have inquired slightly further by re-
See United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U. S. 103, 113
(1927).
17. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S. 149 (1923); Mahler v. Eby,
264 U. S. 32 (1924). However, mere refusal to answer is not sufficient proof to justify
deportation. United States ex rel. Kettunen v. Reimer, 79 F. (2d) 315 (C. C.A. 2d,
1935).
18. In United States ex rel. Ujich v. Commissioner of Immigration, 75 F. (2d) 1022
(C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cert. denied, 295 U. S. 746 (1935), the alien had been arrested for
belief in and advocacy of the overthrow of the government by force or violence. The
entire evidence consisted of statements of others concerning Ujich's alleged beliefs. Al-
though none of the witnesses could repeat Ujich's exact words, his denials of such
beliefs or statements were in vain. See (1935) 3 I. J. A. BULL. no. 9, p. 4. But cf.
Whitfield v. Hanges, 222 Fed. 745 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915).
19. Membership in the Communist Party at time of naturalization has been held a
cause for revoking citizenship. "Attachment to their principles was incompatible with
an attachment to the principles of the Constitution of the United States." United States
v. Tapolcsanyi, 40 F. (2d) 255 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930). Citizenship has been refused where
the applicant desired an amendment to the Constitution to convert the Government to
Communism. In re Saralieff, 59 F. (2d) 436 (E. D. Mo. 1932), aff'd, 62 F. (2d) IND0
(C. C. A. 8th, 1932). But cf. United States v. Rovin, 12 F. (2d) 942 (E. D. Mich. 1926).
20. Greco v. Haff, 63 F. (2d) 863 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933); see Kjar v. Doak, 61 F.
(2d) 566, 569 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932).
21. See Ungar v. Seaman, 4 F. (2d) 80, 82 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924).
22. The language is Judge Hutcheson's. Strecker v. Kessler, 95 F. (2d) 976, 978
(C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
23. United States cx rel. Yokinen v. Commissioner of Immigration, 57 F. (2d) 707
(C. C. A. 2d, 1932), ccrt. denied, 287 U. S. 607 (1932) ; Ex parle Jurgans, 17 F. (2d)
507 (D. Minn. 1927), aff'd, Jurgans v. Seaman, 25 F. (2d) 35 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928);
see Kjar v. Doak, 61 F. (2d) 566, 569 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932); Murdock v. Clark, 53 F.
(2d) 155, 157 (C. C. A. 1st, 1931) ; Ex prte Vilarino, 50 F. (2d) 582, 586 (C. C. A.
9th, 1931) ; Ungar v. Seaman, 4 F. (2d) 80, 81 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924) ; cf. United States
ex rel. Boric v. Marshall, 4 F. Supp. 965 (W. D. Pa. 1933), aff'd, 67 F. (2d) 1020 (C.
C. A. 3d, 1933), cert. granted, 290 U. S. 623 (1933), cert. dismissed, 290 U. S. 709
(1934) (Trade Union Unity League). Contra: Ex parle Fierstein, 41 F. (2d) 53
(C. C. A. 9th, 1930).
24. Wolck v. Weedin, 58 F. (2d) 928 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932) (affiliate of Commun-
ist Party); In re Kosopud, 272 Fed. 330 (N. D. Ohio, 1920).
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quiring proof of the forbidden character of the Communist Party, but their
decisions frequently disposed of this vital issue with the declaration that
sufficient evidence had been presented, but without disclosing its nature.2
Where the court has exposed the evidence in its opinion, it has proved to be
supplied by such sources as statements concerning party purpose made by
one who was a member for a short interval ten years before,20 or by the
introduction of the Communist Manifesto, written in 14S and adapted pri-
marily to European conditions.27 The justification for the use of such obso-
lete evidence has been that a change of policy was not proved.2 8 Indeed, one
court has gone to the length of declaring it sufficient that the party program
does not exclude -violence.2 Where the literature has not been sufficiently
indicative of force or violence, courts have interpolated their own ideas of
Marxism, and have declared that violence will be necessary at some "ulti-
mate" date to bring the program into effect.30 These cases in particular
"prove the tyranny of labels over certain types of minds,"3' for the courts
seemed singularly disturbed by the use of such passionate phrases as "seiz-
ure of power" and "revolutionary," little realizing that they might be used
merely as political clarion calls. In pronouncing Communism and violence
to be inseparable companions, courts have failed to understand that Com-
munist advocacy of force in fighting the inequalities of the capitalist system
is not necessarily an exhortation in support of violent overthrow of the gov-
ernment.32 Denouncements of the bourgeoisie, however bitterly phrased, seem
hardly sufficient to warrant deportation under the statute.
Despite two recent Supreme Court rulings that the criteria for determin-
ing the principles of a political party are the statements of the party assem-
bled in convention,33 the insistent protests of the Communist Party that it
does not advocate force or violence 34 have been consistently ignored in de-
25. Werrman v. Perkins, 79 F. (2d) 467 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935); United States cx
rel. Fernandas v. Commissioner of Immigration, 65 F. (2d) 593 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933);
United States ex ef. Fortmueller v. Commissioner of Immigration, 14 F. Supp. 4S4
(S. D. N. Y. 1936).
26. Berkman v. Tillinghast, 58 F. (2d) 621 (C. C. A. ist, 1932). But cf. Ex pare
Fierstein, 41 F. (2d) 53 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930).
27. Ex parte Vilarino, 50 F. (2d) 582 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931) ; United States cx rel.
Lisafeld v. Smith, 2 F. (2d) 90 (W. D. N. Y. 1924).
28. Berkman v. Tillinghast, 58 F. (2d) 621 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932).
29. "The language used would seem designed to mean all things to all men, and to
be fairly susceptible of meaning, even though it does not unequivocally declare in favor
of, force and violence." United States cx rei. Abern v. Vallis, 268 Fed. 413, 414 (S. D.
N. Y. 1920).
30. United States cx rel. Abern v. Wallis, 268 Fed. 413 (S. D. N. Y. 1920). See
Antolish v. Paul, 283 Fed. 957, 959 (C. C. A. 7th. 1922).
31. The language is again Judge Hutcheson's. Strecker v. Kessler, 95 F. (2d)
976, 977 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
32. See Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 Fed. 17, 61 (D. Mass. 1920), rev'd on other
grounds, Skeffington v. Katzeff, 277 Fed. 129 (C. C. A. 1st, 1922).
33. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73 (1932); Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U. S. 45
(1935).
34. "Communists, despite what their enemies say, do not advocate or idealize vio-
lence." BR0WDER, WHAT is Co .[,IiuNis,? (1936) 166. The present constitution of
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portation proceedings. The result has been the anomaly that the same Com-
munist party which was respectable enough to be accorded an almost univer-
sal place on the ballot3 5 became strictly illegal under judicial interpretation
of deportation statutes. 30 Nowhere has it been satisfactorily explained why
alien residents, who supposedly enjoy the same constitutional protection as
citizens, 37 should be deported for belonging to an organization for which
citizens are perfectly free to vote. The Strecker decision is the first deportation
case which recognizes that the Communist Party, like any other political party,
may be a constantly changing unit both as to purpose and policy.38 Courts
have long accepted this fact in criminal syndicalist cases by refusing to take
judicial notice of the character of an organization, and by requiring proof
in each particular case that the use of inhibited means is advocated.30  The
instant decision has the desirable effect of terminating the unwarranted dis-
tinction between prosecutions under deportation statutes and those under
criminal syndicalist statutes.
The present unfavorable temper of Congress40 apparently affords little
hope for immediate reformation of our backward deportation laws.41 Mean-
the Communist Party of America, adopted in May, 1938, provides that those members
advocating violence shall be expelled from the organization. N, Y. Times, May 29,
1938, § 4, p. 7, col. 3.
35. In 1936 the Communist Party appeared on the ballots of 33 states, includilng
Arkansas, Delaware, Indiana, and Tennessee, where statutes exclude those parties advo-
cating the violent overthrow of government. See Comment (1937) 37 COL. L. Rtv. 86.
36. Membership in the Communist Party has often been held a violation of state
criminal syndicalist statutes. Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927) (Communist
Labor Party); State v. Boloff, 138 Ore. 568, 4 P. (2d) 326 (1931), rehearing denied,
138 Ore. 568, 7 P. (2d) 775 (1932); Commonwealth v. Widowich, 295 Pa. 311, 145
Atl. 295 (1929) ; People v. Ruthenberg, 229 Mich. 315, 201 N. W. 358 (1924) ; People v.
Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23, 136 N. E. 505 (1922) (Communist Labor Party); People v. Taylor,
187 Cal. 378, 203 P. 85 (1921) (Communist Labor Party); see (1936) 4 I. J. A. BULL.
No. 6, p. 4.
37. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886); Wong Wing v. United States,
163 U. S. 228 (1896) ; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915) ; KOHLm, IMMIGRATION AND
ALIENS IN THE UNITED STATES (1936) 327. For vigorous attacks upon the constitu-
tionality of deportation statutes, see CHAFEE, FREEsom OF SPEECH (1920) 280; Bevis,
The Deportation of Aliens (1920) 68 U.. OF PA. L. REv. 97.
38. Compare FOSTER, TOWARD SoIET AMNERICA (1932) 212 with BROWDER, WHAT
Is COMMuNIsM? (1936) 162.
39. Fisk v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380 (1927) ; People v. Erickson, 66 Cal. App. 307, 226
Pac. 637 (1924) ; People v. Thornton, 63 Cal. App. 724, 219 Pac. 1020 (1923). Accord:
Ex parte Campbell, 64 Cal. App. 300, 221 Pac. 952 (1923).
40. More than a score of anti-alien bills were introduced in Congress during 1934-5.
See Where Civil Liberties Stand Today (1935) 83 NEw REPUBLIC 187; also Legis.
(1935) 35 COL. L. Rtv. 917. For discussions of bills since then, see (1936) 4 I. J. A.
BuLL. No. 9, p. 1 (Kerr Bill), (1936) 4 id. No. 11, p. 1 (Starnes Bill) ; (1936) 5 id. at
3 (Dickstein Bill) ; (1937) 5 id. at 131 (Dies Bill) ; (1938) 6 id. at 139 (Dies Bill). Cf.
(1938) 6 id. at 148 (aliens barred from W. P. A.) ; H. Res. 282, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess.
(1938). (Authorization for Dies Investigation).
41. A commission appointed by Secretary of Labor Perkins has recommended that
statutes authorizing deportation for political bbliefs be repealed. N. Y. Times, Apr. 4,
1934, p. 10, col. 4. Various plans of reorganization have been suggested. See CuIrlAn,
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while, however, the courts can do much toward mitigating the harshness of
the statutes.42 The Strecker case is significant as a step toward a higher stand-
ard of proof in expulsion proceedings, where a rash administrative order can
cause much injustice. Since the excuse for these deportations is not that
change is advocated,43 but that change is to be achieved by violence, the
organization to be proscribed should be one unequivocally advocating the
forceful overthrow of the United States Government at the time of the
offense charged. Inferences drawn from radical literature that the party's
prophesies and predictions cannot be attained without force or violence should
not take the place of proof of party objectives; nor should the requisite
proof be established by prior court decisions or such ancient documents as
the Communist Manifesto. Instead, the determinative criteria should be
the actual policy of -the organization at the alleged date of membership as
evidenced by official documents of the party. Any less stringent requirement
is likely to permit perversion of the deportation process into an additional
weapon against American labor leaders who did not happen to be born in
the United States.44
WARRANTIES OF MERCEANDIsE As CONTRACTs OF INSURANCE 4
THE pressure of business necessitates a constant search for new selling
devices. One scheme commonly employed to make merchandise more readily
marketable has been to offer to prospective purchasers virtually all-inclusive
warranties, containing many of the attributes of contracts of insurance. Not
infrequently over-zealous merchants, agreeing to indemnify their customers
against any conceivable damage to the product, have actually consummated
insurance contracts. Alert competitors may then take ready reprisal by
op. cit supra note 7, at 291; VAN VLECx, op. cit. supra note 7, at 247; U. S. NATo:,%L
CoarziSsIoN ON LAW OBSFRVANCE AND EFORCEMENT, REPoRT o. E For=CrENT or
DEPORTATION LAWS or UNITED STATES (1931) 156.
42. The late Commissioner of Immigration MacCormack has characterized our
deportation laws as the harshest in the world. N. Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1934, p. 18, col. 5.
43. Peaceful agitation of a change of our form of government is within the guar-
anteed liberty of speech. See Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 24?, 259 (1937); Strombhrg
v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 369 (1931).
44. Consider, for example, the Bridges case. Although Harry Bridges, West Coast
CIO leader, has been a resident of the United States since 1920, it was not until recently,
when he leaped into prominence as a labor head, that pressure groups began to agitate
for his deportation. A deportation -warrant has been issued, supported solely by affldav-
its of non-members and a photostatic copy of the membership book of Harry Dorgan,
alleged to be Bridges' alias. The preliminary hearing, however, has been postponed
pending the final outcome of the Strecker case. The real reasons for desiring Bridges'
deportation are apparent from the testimony before the Dies Committee, where he was
accused of causing "60% of the labor strife on the West Coast." N. Y. Times, Feb. 9,
1938, p. 6, col. 4; id., Aug. 15, 1938, p. 1, col. 6; id., Aug 31, 1938, p. 1, col. 4.
*State ex rel. Duffy, Att'y Gen. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 16 N. ,. (2d) 256
(Ohio 1938).
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persuading the State Attorney General or Insurance Department to bring a
proceeding against the offender for failure to obtain registration under the
state's insurance laws. A recent case is illustrative of the difficulty facing
a court called upon to decide whether a particular transaction has crossed the
line from a mere warranty of quality and become an agreement to insure.1
A nation-wide dealer in automobile accessories made a practice of giving
all purchasers of pneumatic tires a "guaranty" which provided that in case
the tire should become unfit for further service through any cause whatsoever
-excepting only fire and theft-the seller would repair it or make an allow-
ance toward the purchase of a new tire based upon the unexpired portion
of the period for which the old tire was guaranteed. 2 In the name of the
Attorney General of the State of Ohio, quo warranto proceedings were in-
stituted to enjoin the use of the guaranty on the ground that the company
was unlawfully engaging in the insurance business. The court held that the
agreement in question was not a mere warranty that the goods sold were
free of defects, but was in fact a contract to insure. The company, not licensed
to write insurance, was accordingly enjoined from giving the described "guar-
anty" to its customers.
Similar agreements calling for performance upon the happening of a con-
tingency have been before the courts. The scrambled decisions reflect startling
differences both in judicial conceptions of the legal nature of insurance and
in judicial attitudes toward the morality of particular selling devices. A man-
ufacturer of lubricants promising to repair gears rendered unfit for service
through ordinary wear and tear,3 and a lightning-rod dealer agreeing to
indemnify his customers for a specified time against damage from lightning 4
have been exonerated from the charge of unlawfully writing insurance. An
association's promise to keep the bicycles of its members in repair and to
replace them if lost is said not to be an insurance contract but an agreement
for the rendition of services. 5 Cases on the status of a bargain to repair plate
1. Ibid.
2. The "guaranty" read as follows: "We guarantee the . . . tires bearing serial
numbers below, for . . . months from date of purchase against blowouts, cuts, bruises,
rim-cuts, under-inflation, wheels out of alignment, faulty brakes or other road hazards
that may render the tire unfit for further service (except fire or theft).
"In the event that the tire becomes unserviceable from the above conditions we will
(at our option) repair it free of charge, or replace it with a new tire of the same make
at any of our stores charging . . .th of our current price for each month which has
elapsed sinced the date of purchase . . . "
3. Evans & Tate v. Premier Refining Co., 31 Ga. App. 303, 120 S. E. 553 (1923).
4. Cole Bros. & Hart v. Haven, 7 N. W. 383 (Iowa 1880).
5. Commonwealth ex rel. Hensel v. Provident Bicycle Ass'n, 178 Pa. 636, 36 Ati.
197 (1897). The value of this decision as authority for present law is impaired by the
weight the court places upon the fact that the association did not promise to indemnify
the member through a payment of money. It is well settled today that it suffices if the
insurer promises in case of loss to do any act valuable to the insured, People v. Standard
Plate Glass & Salvage Co., 174 App. Div. 501, 156 N. Y. Supp. 1012 (3d Dep't 1916)
Physicians' Defense Co. v. O'Brien, 100 Minn. 490, 111 N. W. 396 (1907); Shakman
v. United States Credit System Co., 92 Wis. 366, 66 N. W. 528 (1896). The former
view that monetary indemnity was required will be found in State cx rel. Att'y Gett.
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glass and replace it in case of breakage go both ways.8 Nor can courts agree
on whether a contract to defend physicians in malpractice suits is a contract
to insure.7 And a hospital agreeing to care for a sick person during his life
is not an insurer.8 It has been suggested that when the service is routine,
and the main purpose is to protect against sudden expenditures rather than
to secure performance by a particular individual, the agreement is one to
insure; when the service is unique, and the main purpose is performance by
a particular individual, then the contract is a mere service agreement.0
In another line of decisions removed factually from the instant situation
courts have quite uniformly found the elements of insurance to exist. Firms
advertising that payments would be made to their customers in case of ill-
ness or to the heirs of those customers in case of death have been classified
as insurers.1 ° Installment contracts for the purchase of goods or real estate
frequently have been held to be insurance contracts because they contained
a provision that the purchaser's debt would be cancelled in case of death and
v. Farmers & if. Mut. Ben. Ass'n, 18 Neb. 276, 25 N. XV. 81 (185) ; Commonwealth
v. Wetherbee, 105 Mass. 149 (1870).
6. Moresh v. O'Regan, 120 N. J. Eq. 534, 187 At. 619 (Ch. 1936), rcz'd ois other
grounds, 122 N. J. Eq. 388, 192 At. 831 (1937) holds the agreement a contract for
the rendition of services. The court stated that the contrary holding in People v.
Standard Plate Glass & Salvage Co., 174 App. Div. 501, 156 N. Y. Supp. 1012 (3d
Dep't 1916) was based on a different factual situation, without specifying how the cases
were to be distinguished. In an opinion dissenting from the reversal [1 - N. J. Eq. 33,
395, 194 AtI. 156 (1937)], Mr. Justice Heher pointed out that indemnity insurance of
the kind here involved did not fall within the scope of the laws regulating insurance,
citing Solomon v. New Jersey Indemnity Co., 94 N. J. Law 318, 110 Ad. 813 (Sup.
Ct., 1920), aff'd, 95 N. J. Law 545, 113 AtI. 927 (1921).
7. Physicians' Defense Co. v. Cooper, 188 Fed. 832 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1911), aff'd,
199 Fed. 576 (C. C. A. 9th, 1912); Physicians' Defense Co. v. O'Brien, 100 Miinn. 490,
111 N. XV. 396 (1907); see (1912) 25 HARv. L Rnv. 390. Contra: Vredenburgh v.
Physicians' Defense Co., 126 Ill. App. 509 (1906); State v. Laylin, 73 Ohio St. 90,
76 N. E. 567 (1905). It seems that in most cases the physician is interested only in
avoiding the expenses of a lawsuit. The contract should then be considered to be one
of insurance, irrespective of whether the promisor agrees to indemnify the promisee if
a judgment is rendered against him.
8. Sisters of Third Order St. Francis v. Guillaume's Estate, 222 Ill. App. 543
(1921). A company agreeing to furnish medical aid and drugs at special rates has been
held not to be an insurer on the gtound that it only agreed to make all efforts to perform
without incurring an unconditional obligation. State of Washington v. Universal Service
Agency, 87 Wash. 413, 151 Pac. 768 (1915).
9. See Comment (1937) 36 1ficH. L. REv. 311, 313; (1937) 3 U. op PrrsnunLrn
L. Rxv. 250. This distinction would appear to be valuable as evidence of the intent of
the parties, but it does not furnish a conclusive test.
10. Hunt v. Public Mut. Ben. Foundation, 94 F. (2d) 749 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938);
Commonwealth ex rel. Hensel, Att'y Gen. v. Philadelphia Inquirer, 15 Pa. Co. Ct. 463
(1892) (newspaper promising to pay a certain amount to the heirs of any person meeting
death carrying on his person a slip previously signed by him); Nelson v. Board of Trade,
84 L. T. R. 565 (K. B. 1901) (tea dealer promising to those of his customers who had
bought a certain quantity of tea an annuity upon the death of their husbands).
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the object of the sale conveyed to his estate.1 A company agreeing to purchase
the crops of farmers at a certain price with the purpose of guaranteeing a
steady income to those farmers is an insurer.12
Basically, the variation and confusion in this field stem from the vague
and indefinite character of legislative and judicial definitions of the insurance
contract. If insurance is to be defined in one sentence, only generalities may
be employed, and any such definition may, or may not, be extended to em-
brace the ever changing phases in which the subject is presented. A policy
of insurance is commonly defined as an agreement by which one person for
a consideration promises to pay money or its equivalent or to do some act
of value on the destruction or injury of some thing by specified perils. 18
It has been pointed out that to be deemed insurance a contract should do
more than shift the risk involved in a given transaction from the person who
ordinarily would have to bear it to another party. It should, in addition, be
an integral part of a general scheme for distributing a loss that may be
suffered by one individual among a considerable group of persons exposed
to similar perils.14 Courts have often disregarded this admonition-especially
in the class of cases here under discussion. Rather, they have attempted to
erect other criteria designed to assist in the determination of whether a given
transaction falls within the purview of the insurance laws. Most often it has
been stated that an insurance contract has been consummated if the occurrence
of the damage is not within the control of the party promising the indemnity.
Cases dealing with promises to cancel an installment purchaser's debt or make
payments to his heirs in case of death are illustrative of situations where the
11. Attorney General v. Osgood Co., 249 Mass. 473, 144 N. E. 371 (1924), (1924)
24 CoL. L. REv. 802, (1924) 23 MIcn. L. REv. 191; Missouri, K. & T. Trust Co. v.
Krumseig, 77 Fed. 32 (C. C. A. 8th, 1896); Barna v. Clifford Country Estates Inc.,
143 Misc. 813, 258 N. Y. Supp. 671 (N. Y. City Ct., 1932); State v. Beardsley, 88
Minn. 20, 92 N. W. 472 (1902). Contra: Saltzman v. Fairbanks Realty Co., 145 Misc,
478, 260 N. Y. Supp. 334 (Sup. Ct., 1932), reVig, 144 Misc. 243, 257 N. Y. Supp, 575
(N. Y. City Ct., 1932); cf. Missouri, K. & T. Trust Co. v. McLachlan, 59 Minn. 468,
61 N.W. 560 "(1894).
12. State v. Hogan, 8 N. D. 301, 78 N. W. 1051 (1899); cf. Home Title Ins. Co.
v. United States, 50 F. (2d) 107 (C.C.A. 2d, 1931), rcv'g, 41 F. (2d) 793 (E. D.
N. Y. 1930), cert. granted, United States v. Home Title Ins. Co., 284 U. S. 606, aff'd,
285 U. S. 191 (1932); Claflin v. United States Credit System, 165 Mass. 501, 43 N. E.
293 (1896) (company buying and guaranteeing accounts of debtors held insurer) ; Com-
monwealth ex rel. Schnader, Att'y Gen. v. Fidelity Land Value Ass. Co., 312 Pa. 425,
167 Atl. 300 (1933) (company issuing "repurchase bonds" binding issuer to buy real
estate at certain price in order to insure owner of land against depreciation in its value) ,
Tebbets v. Mercantile Credit Guaranty Co., 73 Fed. 95 (C. C. A. 2d, 1896); State v.
Phelan, 66 Mo. App. 548 (1896); Dane v. Mortgage Ins. Co., [1894] 1 Q. B. 54; Title
Insurance and Trust Company v. City of Los Angeles, 61 Cal. App. 232, 214 Pac. 667
(1923); People v. New York Title & Mortgage Co., 346 Ill. 278, 178 N. E. 661 (1931).
13. For statutory definitions see MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 175, § 2; MINN. STAT.
(Mason, 1927) §3314; Miss. CODE ANN. (1930) §5131; MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
(Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 8060; OxLA. STAT. (Harlow, 1931) § 10452; WASU.
REV. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) § 7032. See also CADY, OUTLINES Or INSURANCU
(2d ed. 1925) 2 et seq., VACE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 58.
14. VANcE, op. cit. supra note 13, at 5 et seq.
[Vol. 48
NOTES
control test has been applied.15 If that test is followed blindly, the result is
foregone. The death of the customer is concededly not within the control
of the vendor. It would seem more reasonable to ascertain the purpose of
the agreement and determine whether the parties have any interest in state
supervision of a transaction of this nature."' It has been suggested that the
major purpose of the contract should be the guide to determine whether or
not an agreement of insurance has been undertaken.17  Wlether the parties
intended a sale of insurance or a sale of goods would then be the controlling
factor. Still a third view maintains that the determinative factor is the extent
to which the public interest is involved.18 Proponents of this criterion argue
that insurance laws are designed to protect the public. Regulations concern-
ing registration, capital, and the selection of investments attempt to guarantee
the solvency of insurance companies. Whether a transaction constitutes in-
surance hinges upon whether the public interest demands control by the state.
If no consideration of public policy makes such control desirable, the liberty
of the parties to contract should not be impaired.10
None of the tests outlined above furnishes a precise or satisfactory formula
for the solution of the problem raised by the principal case. From strict
adherence to the control test it would follow that a vendor of merchandise is
not an insurer if he assumes liability only for damages caused by defects in
the article sold.2 0 The "guaranty" in question would be a contract to insure
since the purchaser was to be indemnified against any and all hazards of the
road, many of which were in no sense within the control of the dealer. Such
15. See cases cited supra note 11.
16. The main difference between contracts of this type and ordinary life insurance
agreements is that in the latter case the gist of the action is the payment of money or
the doing of a valuable act at the time of the insured's death; in the former the main
desideratum of the vendee is the acquisition of the goods. The vendee merely wants
to protect his estate against any encumbrance arising out of the contract of sale. This
has been recognized in Saltzman v. Fairbanks Realty Co., 145 Misc. 478, 249 N. Y.
Supp. 334 (Sup. Ct. 1932). The decision, however, is based on the ground that the seller
in this case-as distinguished from similar cases--had the alternative right of refunding
to the estate the purchase money paid so far, or conveying the goods. The distinction
does not seem to explain the difference in the results. Some of the cases can be explained
on the ground that the courts considered the transaction to be usurious and used the
insurance laws in order to prevent an evasion of the usury laws. Equity Service v.
Agull, 156 Misc. 552, 281 N. Y. Supp. 292 (N. Y. City Ct., 1935); Missouri, K. & T.
Trust Co. v. Krumseig, 77 Fed. 32 (C. C_. A. 8th, 1S96); see (1937) 46 YAIX L J. 1416.
17. James Eva Estate v. Mecca Co., 40 Cal. App. 515, 181 Pac. 415 (1919); Com-
ments (1937) 15 N. C. L. Rav. 417, (1937) 36 MicH. L. y. 311.
18. Annuity contracts, although not considered as agreements to insure, may be
treated like insurance transactions. MAss. GMN. Lmws (1932) c. 175, § 118; futual
Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 227 Mass. 63, 116 N. E. 469 (1917). Benevolent
associations may be exempted from insurance regulations. Fischer v. American Legion
of Honor, 168 Pa. 279, 31 Atl. 10S9 (1895) ; Comment (1937) 15 N. C. L. REV. 417,
420. For suggestions of other tests compare Comment (1936) 36 Co- L. r\-.. 456.
19. See Comment (1937) 23 CoRN. L. Q. 188, criticizing the decision in People v.
Roschli, 275 N. Y. 26, 9 N. E. (2d) 763 (1937) for not respecting this postulate.
20. Patterson, Selling Insurance with Merchandise (Jan. 1928) Jou. ArmE I;s.
25; Comment (1937) 15 T. C. L. RE%. 417.
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a solution indulges in over-simplification. Application of either of the other
tests would lead to the opposite decision. The primary purpose of the contract
was not to provide for repair or replacement upon the happening of a con-
tingency. The intent of the parties was to buy and sell a tire. Similarly, it
is difficult to isolate any principle of public policy which demands state super-
vision in this situation. A company which sells life insurance together with
merchandise should be subject to the same supervision as a company which
merely sells life insurance. But there is a definite distinction between such
cases and cases in which the seller wishes to make his merchandise more
desirable by guaranteeing its quality or its use for a certain period-even if
this "guaranty" is sufficiently broad to include accidental damage.
The "guaranty" in question lends itself to a variety of constructions. It
should be noted that the vendor did not promise to reimburse the vendee if
any damage to the tire occurred. He also did not promise to replace it, but
merely agreed to make an allowance on the purchase price of a new tire
proportioned to the unexpired portion of the period of "guaranty." It can
not be said that the purchaser was insured against the loss of the tire.2 1 The
agreement may be construed to be one for the rendition of services. An
advisory opinion by the Attorney General of Massachusetts has stated that
a contract binding a company dealing in electrical machinery to keep its
customer's machines in repair is not a contract of insurance.2 2 A certain
risk was involved as to the extent of the repairs, but the undertaking was
not believed to be hazardous. The assumption of a continuing duty, indefinite
in extent, in consideration of a fixed sum, was said not to be enough of
itself to outlaw the agreement. A contractual promise to guarantee reports
on the solvency of business firms has been held not an insurance contract,
but only a warranty of efficiency of service, anticipating the possible damage
caused by negligent performance.23 It may therefore be argued that the dealer
agreed to service the tire for a specified period of time and, if necessary, to
deliver a new tire with an allowance on the price. This promise is supported
by the same consideration as the promise to convey the tire purchased. The
argument gathers force from the fact that the dealer did not promise to replace
the object of the sale. Similar agreements have been classed as service con-
tracts even though the vendor was under a duty both to repair and replace. -"
The contract under consideration may also be interpreted as a promise
to deliver a second tire for a special price under a certain contingency, sup-
ported by the same consideration as the promise to convey the first tire.
Bargains are commonly made for the sale of goods which give the buyer an
option to return the goods under a contingency not within the control of
either party. Often, the privilege of the buyer, a retail dealer, to return goods
to a wholesale dealer is made dependent upon the former's opportunity to
21. Reply Memorandum for Respondent, pp. 3, 4, State ex rel. Duffy, Att'y Gen.
v. Western Auto Supply Co., 16 N. E. (2d) 256 (Ohio 1938).
22. O's. Ar'y GEN. pp. 544, 547 (Mass. 1898).
23. People ex rel. Daily Credit Service Corp. v. May, 162 App. Div. 215, 147 N.Y.
Supp. 487 (3d Dep't 1914), aff'd, 212 N. Y. 561, 106 N. E. 1039 (1914).
24. Moresh v. O'Regan, 120 N. J. Eq. 534, 187 AtI. 619 (Ch., 1936), rev'd on other
grounds, 122 N. J. Eq. 388, 192 Atl. 831 (1937); Commonwealth ex rel. Hensel v.
Provident Bicycle Ass'n, 178 Pa. 636, 36 Atl. 197 (1897).
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sell the merchandise. 25 The sale is unconditional; title passes to the vendee.
Yet it could hardly be argued that the wholesale dealer insures the other
party against a loss arising out of inability to sell the goods. Rigid applica-
tion of the control test would outlaw numerous transactions in modem business
life which have hitherto passed unquestioned.20
But it is believed that the best construction of the "guaranty" would con-
sider it to be the usual warranty accompanied by an anticipated settlement
of possible disputes over the cause of damage to the tire arising within a
specified time.2 7 A purchaser of automobiles or accessories is frequently in
an unfortunate position if he claims a breach of warranty and damages from
the sale of a defective product. The cause of the damage is usually a problem
which experts find difficult of solution. The customer will be less efficiently
represented, if litigation develops, than the corporate vendor. To overcome
the sales resistance engendered by these facts and to preserve the good will
of his customers, the dealer in the instant case agreed to waive all oppor-
tunity to escape responsibility for any damage arising within a specified
time.28 The court is correct in saying that the risk of accidental damage has
thereby shifted from the buyer to the seller. But, as heretofore intimated,
a mere shift of the risk does not constitute a contract of insurance3' A
distribution of that risk among persons exposed to the same perils, and a
ratable contribution by those persons to a common fund is necessary before
"insurance" exists.30
Even if it be assumed that the "guaranty" under consideration is an agree-
ment to insure, it is not a necessary consequence that the tire dealer be
25. Ferry & Co. v. Hall, 188 Ala. 178, 66 So. 104 (1914) ; cf. House v. Beak, 141
Ill. 290, 30 N.E. 1065 (1892); 1 WLuSTON, SALJ-s (2d ed. 1924) §§ 272, 273.
26. Another possible construction of the "guaranty" is to regard it as an absolute
warranty, as if the dealer wanted to warrant that his tires were of such quality that
no road hazards could really destroy them. Whatever objections could be raised against
such a trade practice, it seems certain that no violation of the insurance laws may be
found in the giving of such an absolute warranty.
27. People ex rel. Daily Credit Corp. v. May, 162 App. Div. 215, 147 N. Y. Supp.
487 (3d Dep't 1914), aff'd, 212 N. Y. 561, 106 N. E. 1039 (1914).
28. Similar agreements have been held to constitute a varranty for the efficiency
of the performance by the vendor. Evans & Tate v. Premier Refining Co., 31 Ga. App.
303, 120 S. E. 553 (1923) ; Cole Bros. & Hart v. Haven, 7 N. V. 383 (Iowa 1830). The
courts in the cases cited realized that the bargains were merely efforts on the part of
the vendors to promote their sales. Neither vendor had any more control over the hap-
pening of the damage than the tire dealer in the instant case. But see National Sales
v. Manciet, 83 Ore. 34, 162 Pac. 1055 (1917).
29. VA_ ca, op. cit. mtpra note 13, at 5. A lessor agreeing to replace a leased piano
in case of its destruction by fire while in the custody of the lessee was believed not to
be an insurer. Re Fire Certificate, 39 Pa. Co. Ct. 163 (Ops. A'rT'y GmT. 1911).
30. In Ollendorf Watch Co. v. Pink, 253 App. Div. 73, 300 N. Y. Supp. 1175 (3d
Dep't 1937), (1938) 51 HAnv. L. REv. 1298, it was held that the agreement of a jeweler
to replace every watch bought from him in case of robbery within one year was not
insurance. This would seem to be much more of a borderline case than the principal
one. The court based its decision partly on the fact that no additional premium was
given for the promise of the vendor to replace the watch. First Baptist Church v.
Brooklyn Fire Ins. Co., 28 N. Y. 153 (1863). It was explicitly stated that the protection
offered the public was merely a mode of advertising.
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required to comply with regulatory insurance laws. Courts have frequently
stated that the fact that part of a contract is an agreement to insure does
not inevitably bring the whole transaction within the scope of insurance regu-
lation. The particular section may be merely incidental to the major pur-
pose of the contract. If the writing of insurance is only a minor share of
a corporation's activities, the organization need not be classified as an insurance
company.31 The main activity of the instant tire dealer was the sale of auto-
motive accessories. Application of the above principle would unquestionably
permit it to continue that business unmolested.
Courts are quick to unearth an insurance contract in suits by private
individuals who have dealt with a corporation in the misguided belief that
they were bargaining with a licensed insurance company. But cases in which
the state proceeds against an organization to force it to comply with the
insurance regulations seem to stand on a different footing.32 While strict con-
struction is commendable in any case involving a device to spread risks,
the Court seems to have been far too technical in the instant case. In view
of the bitter rivalry in the manufacture and marketing of automobile tires,
it may be permissible to assume that the Attorney General was influenced by
the respondent's competitors in filing the present action. Possibly these rivals
considered that the respondent's course of conduct should be branded as
unfair competition. If the dealer's acts were really reprehensible, the law
of unfair competition, rather than a fortuitous ruling on insurance, should
furnish the remedy. It may be said parenthetically that nothing like an unfair
trade practice can be discerned in the respondent's actions, insofar as they
are known. In the light of the methods of mail-order house marketing em-
ployed by the large tire manufacturers,33 the warranty in question seems
above reproach. At any rate, it should not be stifled by a warped construction
of the insurance laws.34
31. In re Prudence Co., 10 F. Supp. 33 (E. D. N. Y. 1935), In re Prudence Co.,
10 F. Supp. 41 (E. D. N. Y. 1935), aff'd, 79 F. (2d) 77 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); Comment
(1936) 36 COL. L. REv. 456, 462. If only a minor part of the transaction consists of
an agreement to insure, the court will hold the insurance aspect a mere incidental
feature and will not require compliance with the laws regulating insurance. James
Eva Estate v. Mecca Co., 40 Cal. App. 515, 181 Pac. 415 (1919); Colaizzi v. Penn-
sylvania R. R., 208 N. Y. 275, 101 N. E. 859 (1913) ; VANCE, op. cit. supra note 13, at 61.
32. Compare Marcus v. Heralds of Liberty, 241 Pa. 429, 88 Atl. 678 (1913), with
Commonwealth v. Equit. Ben. Ass'n, 137 Pa. 412, 18 Atl. 1112 (1890) ; and State ex rel.
Sheets v. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry., 68 Ohio St. 9, 67 N. E. 93 (1903), with
Bankers Health & Life Ins. Co. v. Knott, 41 Ga. App. 639, 154 S. E. 194 (1930).
33. In the matter of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Fed. Trade Comm. (Docket
2216); see HAMILTON, PRICE AND PRICE POLICIES (1st ed. 1938) 83, 110; Reynolds,
Competition in the Rubber Tire Industry (1938) 28 Am. EcoN. REv. 459.
34. It seems, however, that this method of fighting competitors is successful, for
the old warranty has been abandoned, and the tire company, even in states other than
Ohio, now gives to its customers a "guaranty" which reads as follows: "We guarantee
the . . . tires bearing serial numbers below, for .... months from date of purchase
against bruises, breaks, blowouts, rim-cuts, premature wear and damage that may




CONSTRUCTION OF THE THREE-JUDGE COURT PROVISION OF THE
JUDICIARY ACT OF 1937"
IN its first and only decision construing Section 3 of the Judiciary Act
of 19371 the Supreme Court revealed ambiguities in the wording of the
statute that had led both counsel and courts below into fundamental error.
The Donnelly Garment Co., with its factory union as intervenor, sought an
injunction against the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union to
restrain the latter from committing certain acts while attempting to organize
Donnelly workers. In their bill the plaintiffs contended that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act2 was inapplicable to the situation, but that if held applicable
the statute would be invalid. Overriding the principal defense that the Act
barred the granting of the injunction, a single district judge nevertheless
issued a temporary restraining order,3 then, after the passage of the Judiciary
Act of August 24, 1937,4 certified to the Attorney-General that the consti-
tutionality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act had been drawn in question. A court
of three judges, convened under Section 3 of the Judiciary Act, decided that
there was no labor dispute, that therefore the Norris-LaGuardia Act was
inapplicable, and granted an interlocutory injunction.5 Taking the case on
direct appeal as provided by the Judiciary Act, the Supreme Court held the
case not within the terms of Section 3, from which it followed that the three-
judge court had never had jurisdiction. The decree below was vacated and
remanded to the District Court for further proceedings to be taken inde-
pendently of Section 3.6
Essential to this decision was a distinction made between the wording of
Section 1 of the Act, providing for the intervention of the Government if
the constitutionality of a federal statute is merely "drawn in question," and
that of Section 3, which provides for a three-judge court upon "application
for an injunction restraining the operation of a federal statute."8 The con-
*International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, ct al. v. Donnelly Garment Co.
et al., 304 U. S. 243 (1938).
1. 50 STAT. 753 (1937), 28 U. S. C. §380a (Supp. 1937).
2. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. §§101-115 (1934).
3. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Donnelly Garment Co., 20 F.
Supp. 767 (V. D. Mo., 1937) (opinion denying a motion to dissolve the restraining
order and dismiss the complaint).
4. 50 STAT. 751 (1937), 28 U.S. C. §§ 349a, 3M0a, 401 (Supp. 1937).
5. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Donnelly Garment Co., 21 F.
Supp. 807 (W. D. Mo., 1937).
6. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Donnelly Garment Co., 304
U. S. 243 (1938).
7. 50 STAT. 751 (1937), 28 U.S.C. §401 (Supp. 1937). Section 2 of the Act
provides for direct appeal in any case in which the Government is a party or has inter-
vered, if the decision is "against the constitutionality of any Act of Congress.' 50 STAT.
752 (1937), 28 U.S. C. §349a (Supp. 1937).
8. I. L. G. W. U. v. Donnelly Garment Co., 304 U. S. 243, 250. The relevant part
of Section 3 provides, "No interlocutory or permanent injunction suspending or restrain-
ing the enforcement, operation or execution of, or setting aside, in whole or in part,
any Act of Congress upon the ground that such Act or any part thereof is repugnant
to the Constitution of the United States . . . "
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tention of the plaintiffs, that the Norris-LaGuardia Act would be invalid
if applicable, was said to be merely an anticipation of a defense and not "an
application for an injunction in any proper sense of the term as used in
Section 3." Accordingly, the rule has been laid down that Section 3 applies
only to suits directed against governmental officers or agencies, and not to
suits between private parties.
On a matter of statutory interpretation, the first step must be an examina-
tion of the available direct evidence of congressional intent., The first two
sections of the Act were introduced as H. R. 2260 by Chairman Summers
of the House Judiciary Committee on January 8, 1937,10 a month before the
President introduced his "Court Plan", 11 and in the storm of controversy
that followed, H. R. 2260 was forgotten. However, after the demise of the
President's bill,1 2 the future Judiciary Act was revived. Sections 1 and 2
were thoroughly debated in both House and Senate,' 3 but Section 3, belatedly
introduced by the Senate Judiciary Committee, 14 received almost no attei-
tion. After minor amendments were agreed upon, H. R. 2260 was passed
in a burst of speed that stifled any possible comment on the applicability of
Section 3 to suits between private parties.1 Only from the discussion of other
bills introduced to effect a similar purpose16 may the conclusion be drawn
that the evil sought to be cured was the wasteful suspension of the operation
of Government agencies by the hasty decision of a single judge.'1 Not even
these bills, however, stated by their terms whether the use of the three-judge
court was to be extended to include suits between private parties. Conse-
quently the only direct clue as to the purpose of the present act is to be
found in a letter to the Editor of the New York Times from I. W. Summers,
9. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U. S. 178, 194 (1922); Balanced Rock Scenic
Attractions Inc. v. Town of Manitou, 38 F. (2d) 28 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930), cert. denicd,
281 U.S. 764 (1930).
10. 81 CONG. REc. 139 (1937).
11. 81 CONG. REC. 877 (1937).
12. 81 CONG. REc. 7375 (1937).
13. See index to debates and reports on H. R. 2260 in Part 11, 81 CoNG. REc. (1937).
14. SEN. REP. No. 963, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 4 (report of the Senate judiciary
Committee on H. R. 2260).
15. See N. Y. Times, August 8, 1937, p. 1, col. 7.
16. H. R. 4899, 81 CONG. Rm 1390 (1937) (limiting the jurisdiction of district
and circuit courts with respect to injunctions against acts of Congress on grounds of
their unconstitutionality); S. 1174, 81 CONG. REc. 482 (1937) (prohibiting district and
circuit courts from issuing injunctions against acts of Congress until such have beeni
declared invalid by the Supreme Court) ; H. R. 3895, 81 Coxo. REC. 542 (1937) (limiting
the power of federal courts respecting legislation by Congress); H. R. 4279, 81 Co,o.
REc. 820 (1937) (prohibiting federal courts from passing on the constitutionality of Acts
of Congress); S. 877, 81 CoNG. Rc. 259 (1937) (providing for direct appeal to the
Supreme Court from orders of federal courts prohibiting compliance with federal kaves),
17. Injunctions restraining the Tennessee Valley Authority alone, as of December
31, 1935, caused a daily accruing expense of $5,129. SEN. Doc. No. 182, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1936) 23. See also SEN. Doc. No. 44, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) ; 81 CoNG.
REc. 259, 479 (1937); SEN. REs. 82, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., (1937).
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Chairman of the House judiciary Committee.' Discussing the bill generally,
he referred to Section 3 as applying "in the event a petition is filed with a
federal judge to enjoin the Federal Governent or its agencies,10 on the
ground of the unconstitutionality of an Act of Congress . . . "
An opposite inference, however, may be drawn from the wording of Sec-
tion 3 itself. From a literal point of view, it might be reasoned that any
injunction based on the unconstitutionality of a statute would suspend its
operation,- at least on the facts of the particular case, and so fall within
the terms of Section 3 even though the order runs against a private party.
Furthermore, there appears to be an extremely significant omission in the
text of the act. Section 266 of the judicial Code,2 ' a similar statute restricting
the issuance of injunctions against state statutes, is expressly limited to suits
seeking to restrain "the action of any officer of such state in the enforcement
or execution of such statute." This limitation is not to be found in Section
3, and while there is no mention of the omission in the Congressional Record,
it could be implied that the statute was not intended to have the narrow effect
such a limitation would impose.P On the other hand, Congressional reports
and debates 24 indicate that the operation of Section 3 was intended to cor-
respond to Section 266 and to the Urgent Deficiencies Act,25 which restricted
the granting of injunctions against orders of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. By their terms, these acts strictly limit the jurisdiction of the three-
judge court, and decisions construing them have been equally narrow.26 In
18. N. Y. Times, August 15, 1937, Section IV, p. 8, col. 5.
19. Italics supplied.
20. However, this interpretation would assume that the words "enforcement, opera-
tion or execution" each mean a different thing. While an injunction in a suit between
private parties might well "suspend" the "operation!' of a statute, it would not necessarily
"restrain" its "enforcement". Cf. Section 266 of the Judicial Code, 37 STAT. 1013 (1913),
as amended 43 STAT. 938 (1925), 28 U.S. C. §3S0 (1934). Further confusion is
created by the apparently superfluous addition of the term "setting aside . . . any
Act," which did not appear in Section 266. See note 8, supra.
21. 37 STAT. 1013 (1913), as amended 43 STAT. 938 (1925), 28 U.S.C. §3S0 (1934).
22. See note 13, supra.
23. The implication, however, is weakened by the complete absence of any explana-
tion of so vital an omission. This, coupled with the fact that the bill was rushed through
with all possible speed, would seem to indicate that the omission vas unintentional.
24. Sm. REP. No. 963, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 4; 81 Co=o. REc. 8703 (1937).
25. 38 STAT. 220 (1913), 28 U. S. C. § 47 (1934).
26. Jurisdiction has been denied on a variety of grounds. Seclioi z66: Smith v.
Wilson, 273 U. S. 388 (1927) (application for preliminary injunction not pressed to a
hearing); Ex parte Collins, 277 U. S. 565 (1928) (suit to enjoin the enforcement of a
municipal ordinance); Ex parte Hobbs, 280 U. S. 168 (1929) (plaintiff raised consti-
tutional question in bill, but then conceded it); Ex parte Poresky, 290 U. S. 30 (1933)
(no substantial federal question); Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 292 U. S. 16
(1934) (suit to enjoin assessment of property under state statute, and not to enjoin
statute) ; Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Oklahoma Packing Co., 292 U. S. 385 (1934)
(not a suit to restrain the action of a state officer). Urgent Dcficiendces Act: Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 235 (1931) (Commission's order was purely negative
in character) ; Pittsburgh & NV. Va. Ry. v. United States, -81 U. S. 479 (1930) (three-
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no case have they been extended to cover suits between private parties. Since
they seem to form the basis for the procedure involved in Section 3,27 it may
reasonably be argued that decisions interpreting them should control in the
present case, and that a correspondingly strict limitation of the three-judge
court under Section 3 would follow the intent of the framers of the act.2"
But at best, the available direct evidence is inconclusive, and an indirect
approach must be taken to the problem of interpretation. Although the exact
purpose of Section 3 was not revealed, the general aims of Congress in the
enactment of the Judiciary Act as a whole are reasonably familiar.29 Insofar
as the operation of the Act is foreseeable, an attempt may be made to evaluate
the broad' and the narrow interpretations of Section 3 in the light of these
general aims. First, of course, it was desired to expedite the decision of
constitutional questions.30 In this respect, the extension of the use of the
three-judge court to private suits would make a difference only in those cases
deciding in favor of the constitutionality of an act of Congress, and here
there is not the same necessity for speed. In those cases where the Govern-
ment is a party or has intervened, and a statute is declared invalid by a
single judge, direct appeal is already given by Section 2 of the Judiciary
Act.31 If it be argued that it was the further intention of Congress to secure
greater deliberation in any case where the validity of a federal statute was
questioned, it must be admitted that such an aim would be promoted by a
broad interpretation of Section 3. Yet Section 1 provides for no three-judge
courts, and there is no more reason for supplying such a safeguard in in-
junction cases between private parties than there is in the cases falling under
Section 1, in which the operation of a statute may be just as vitally affected.
No necessity alipears for different treatment of cases which do and cases which
do not involve injunctions, where neither entails a direct restriction of govern-
ment operations.
Wholly apart from the purpose of Congress in enacting Section 3, the
extension of that section to suits betveen private parties would involve serious
practical and procedural difficulties. Issues of constitutional law might be
judge court could not consider questions incidental to subject-matter specially mentioned
in statute). See Bowen, When are Three Federal Jtdges Required? (1931) 16 MIxN.
L. REv. 1.
27. See note 24, supra.
28. A further argument based on the internal evidence in the statute may be made
that if injunction suits between private parties fall under Section 3, and are directly
appealable under that section, there would seem to be a serious overlap between Sections
2 and 3. Both would provide for direct appeal in those cases where the Government
had intervened and the decision was against the validity of a statute, That argument
loses its force, however, when it is considered that even under the narrow interpretation
there is a certain overlap where the Government is a party and the statute is declared
unconstitutional.
29. See N. Y. Times, July 28, 1937, p. 1, col. 1.
30. 81 CoNG. Rc. 8703 (1937).
31. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the Government would intervene in all
cases in which the constitutional question appears serious, so that the situation would
rarely arise where a decision against the validity of a federal statute could be appealed
only under a broad interpretation of Section 3 and not under Section 2.
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dragged into almost any injunction suit where the plaintiff felt it to be ad-
vantageous to sue in a three-judge court and appeal directly to the highest
tribunal. If the constitutional question were unsubstantial the Government
might not choose to intervene, as in the instant case. Yet a three-judge
court would always have to be convened, thus upsetting inferior court routine,
and the case on appeal would have to go directly to the Supreme Court," -
adding to its already over-burdened docket.33 Further, wherever there is
direct appeal, the Supreme Court and the attorneys involved are deprived
of the benefit of the experience and understanding of the case gained through
the intermediate appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals. Similarly, on direct
appeal with only private parties involved, vital facts and issues might be left
obscured,3 4 as would not be so likely if the intermediate step to the Circuit
Court of Appeals were taken, or if the case rested solely on constitutional
grounds and was not cluttered with other considerations advanced by private
litigants.35
Perhaps, however, the most serious objection to a broad interpretation of
Section 3 lies in the jurisdictional difficulties that would arise. It would be,
of course, within the province of the single district judge to whom the appli-
cation for injunction was first made, to determine whether or not Section
3 applied.3 6 If he incorrectly decided that it did apply, a three-judge court
might agree with him, and not until the case readied the Supreme Court
would it be found that the original jurisdictional decision was erroneous. As
32. While Section 3 states that an appeal "may" be taken to the Supreme Court,
a similar provision of Section 266 has been construed to make this direct appeal man-
datory. Jackson v. Craven, 238 Fed. 117 (C. C. A. 5th, 1916) ; Brucker v. Fisher, 49 F.
(2d) 759 (C. C.A. 6th, 1931).
33. Perhaps the greatest objection in this respect is that the Court would have no
power of selection. See Mr. Chief Justice Hughes' discussion of the crowded Supreme
Court docket in Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Committee on S. a176, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1935) 7; Frankfurter and Fisher, Business of the Supreme Court at t,e
October Terms, z935 and 1936, (1938) 51 HAv. L. R-v. 577.
34. See Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Conmittee on S. 2176, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1935) 6. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, in discussing unnecessary appeals under
Section 266, stated, "The result has been that the Court has been met with appeals
from interlocutory orders in that class of cases where the facts have not yet been
examined, where the merits were not determined, and the only proper question before
the Court on appeal was whether there had been such an abuse of discretion that the
interlocutory order should be set aside."
35. The same objection may of course be made to cases under Sections 1 and 2
in which the decision is against the constitutionality of a statute. However, there is no
reason for extending the direct appeal to include cases in which the validity of a statute
is upheld, as would be the result of a broad interpretation of Section 3.
36. There would have to be a substantial constitutional question, and it would be
within the province of the single district judge to dismiss for want of substantiality.
Ex parle Poresky, 290 U. S. 30 (1933) (under Sec. 266). But if the single district
judge assembles the three-judge district court, he loses jurisdiction over the case, and
cannot dismiss it. Ex parte Northern Pac. R.R., 280 U. S. 142 (1929) (Sec. 266). How-
ever, even if the three-judge court decided against the substantiality of the constitutional
question, an appeal to the Supreme Court on the jurisdictional point would presumably
be available.
1938]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48
in the instant case, the whole proceeding would begin over again before a
single judge.37 On the other hand, the original judge's decision might be
against the applicability of Section 3, and then reversal or remanding would
come from the Supreme Court or the Circuit Court of Appeals on appeal
or through writ of mandamus. Such a jurisdictional merry-go-round would
offer innumerable opportunities for delay, and the merits of the case might
not be heard for months or years.38 Under the narrow interpretation of
Section 3 this difficulty will be eliminated, for the issues will be clear-cut as
to whether or not an injunction is within the terms of the statute.30
The Supreme Court, then, while maintaining its tradition of self-restraint
in matters of its own jurisdiction, has adopted the interpretation of Section 3
which seems preferable from every external consideration. Whether or not
it is consonant with strict rules of interpretation based entirely on the wording
of the statute itself seems to be an unanswerable question of relatively slight
importance, especially in view of the haste with which the Judiciary Act was
drafted and passed.
CONSTIT~iTIONALITY OF SECTION 77(N) OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT*
SUBDIVISION (n) of the Railroad Reorganization Act provides, inter alia,
that the claims of employees for personal injuries shall be preferred as "oper-
ating expenses."' Before the passage of Section 77, the phrase "operating
37. The single district judge to whom the instant case was remanded held that
there was a labor dispute, and that the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited the granting
of an injunction. The constitutional issue was not discussed. International Ladies'
Garment Workers' Union v. Donnelly Garment Co., 23 F. Supp. 998 (1938). If the
case is not yet moot, another series of appeals will have to be taken before a final
authoritative decision is reached. Speed, which should be of the essence in cases in-
volving labor troubles, is virtually impossible under these circumstances. If the single
district judge had retained jurisdiction the difficulties of the instant case would have
been eliminated, and a rapid decision could have been had on the merits. But note that
the jurisdiction of the three-judge court in such cases would not have been settled.
38. For a discussion of a jurisdictional problem similar to that of the instant case,
arising under a state anti-injunction act, see (1938) 18 B. U. L. Rvy. 621.
39. It has been established by cases under Section 266 that when the bill for in-
junction alleges alternatively that the officer or agency is acting beyond the authority
conferred by statute, or if not the statute is unconstitutional, the three-judge court has
jurisdiction. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378 (1932); Van Dyke v. Geary, 244
U. S. 39 (1917); Fisher v. Brucker, 41 F. (2d) 774 (E. D. Mich., 1930), appeal
dismissed, 49 F. (2d) 759 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931).
* Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Williams, 95 F. (2d) 210 (C. C. A. 8th,
1938); Thompson v. Siratt, 95 F. (2d) 214 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938).
1. BANY.RUPTCy Act § 77(n), 49 STAT. 923 (1935), 11 U. S. C. § 205(n) (Supp.
1937).
No provision parallel to 77(n) was placed in 77B, which provides for the reorgani-
zation of corporations other than railroads. Two reasons for the omission suggest them-
selves. No powerful pressure group was present to insist on the inclusion of a similar
section in 77B, while the railroad brotherhoods actively sought the passage of 77(n).
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expenses" 2 referred to those few pre-receivership claims which equity courts
considered to be entitled to priority over the aristocratic mortgage liens
It had long been established that while claims for wages 4 and for necessary
supplies and repairs5 were within this category, pre-receivership tort claims
generally were not.6 Nevertheless, in two recent cases the constitutionality
of Section 77(n) was sustained, and claims arising out of injuries which
had occurred more than two years before the appointment of the trustees
were allowed to displace existing mortgage liens pro tanto.7
In upholding this exercise of the federal bankruptcy power as consistent
with due process, the court adopted the broad construction generally given
to the bankruptcy clause of the Constitution.8 By their very nature most
bankruptcy laws make it possible to impair the obligations of contract, but
the only restraints laid upon Congress are that bankruptcy laws must be
uniform and that they must not impair the substantive rights of creditors
in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner.' 0
With the exception of public service corporations, the convenient concept of "operating
expenses" to which a similar provision might be tied has not applied to private busi-
ness corporations. Spencer v. Taylor Creek Ditch Co., 194 Fed. 635 (C. C. A. 9th,
1912); see Fordham, Prcfcrenccs of Prc-Rccchcrship Claims in Equity Rccdtcrslips
(1931) 15 Mixx. L. REv. 261, 281-283. But see note 47, in! ro.
2. 47 STAT. 1482 (1933), 11 U. S. C. §205(s) (1934), the predecessor of 77(n),
did not expressly classify employees' tort claims as operating expenses.
3. See Metcalfe, Priority over Mortgagees of Debts Contracted by Railroad before
Receivership (1894) 39 CEx. L. J. 241, 242-3. Until 1933 the types of claims classified
as operating expenses showed no material change. See Fordhan, supra note 1, 267,
275. The question that has remained to vex the courts is as to when payment of oper-
ating expenses may be made from the corpus of the road before the mortgagees receive
anything. Section 77(n) merely classifies certain claims as operating expenses, leaving
the courts to apply the rules they have worked out with regard to the funds from which
such claims should be paid. For the latter, see Fordham, supra, 279-281 and Fitzgibbon,
The Present Status of the Six Months' Rule (1934) 34 CoL. L. Ry. 230, 241-246. A
source of confusion in the cases has been in the running together of two questions,
what operating expenses are, and from what funds operating expenses should be paid.
E.g., United States & M. T. Co. v. Beaty, 240 Fed. 592 (C. C.A. 8th, 1917). Only the first
question is relevant to the instant inquiry.
4. Calhoun v. St. Louis & Southeastern Ry., 14 Fed. 9 (C C D. Ind. 188-0);
Finance Co. of Penn. v. Charleston, C. & C. R. R., 49 Fed. 693 (C. C. D. S. C. 1892).
5. Union Trust Co. v. Illinois .Midland Ry., 117 U. S. 434 (18S6); Southern Rail-
way v. Carnegie Steel Co., 176 U. S. 257 (1900).
6. St. Louis Trust Co. v. Riley, 70 Fed. 32 (C. C. A. 8th, 1895); Pitcairn v.
Fisher, 78 F. (2d) 649 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935). Contra: Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v.
Northern Pacific R. R., 71 Fed. 245 (C. C. D. Wash. 1895).
7. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Williams, 95 F. (2d) 210 (C. C. A. 8th,
1938); Thompson v. Siratt, 95 F. (2d) 214 (C. C. A. Sth, 1938). See note 46, inra.
8. U. S. CoxsT. Art. I, § 8. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v.
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 294 U. S. 648 (1935); Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U. S.
445 (1937).
9. U. S. CoxsT. Art. I, § S. No question as to this requirement is involved in the
principal cases.
10. See Wright v. Vinton Branch Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U. S. 440, 470 (1937).
The broad dictum laid down in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S.
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In order then to evaluate the instant decisions, it is only necessary to deter-
mine whether Congress has been unreasonable or arbitrary. For this purpose
the standards set up for preferred claims in equity receiverships, while far
from conclusive, are the best available criteria. The claims that would have
been allowed priority before the passage of 77 are generally determinable,
but the reasons lying behind such preferential treatment were never clear.
In a dictum in Fosdick v. Schall," the Supreme Court first approved the
payment of operating expenses ahead of the liens of mortgagees, partly on
the ground that these expenses represented a strengthening of the latter's
security. It was further said that the bondholders tool: their mortgages with
knowledge that the public interest demanded the continuous operation of
the railroads and that operation required the meeting of certain expenses.
The court therefore implied an agreement that mortgage liens should extend
only to net and not to gross receipts.12 On this foundation, a number of
criteria were gradually erected for the determination of "operating expens-
es" entitled to priority. Of these, three prerequisites stand out as those which
the courts have most often attempted to apply.'8 The claim must represent
a debt contracted with reliance on payment out of current income and not
on the general credit of the company ;14 it must have arisen within a reason-
ably brief time prior to the appointment of the receiver ;" and it must have
been for an expense necessarily incurred in keeping the railroad a going
concern.'1
Although the first touchstone has occasionally been useful,1 its vagueness
subjects it to almost any interpretation,' 8 and it has in fact often been ig-
555, 601, 602 (1935), relied on by counsel for the mortgage trustee in both instant cases,
that the substantive rights of mortgagees may not be taken without just compensation,
even under the bankruptcy power, was strictly limited two years later in the Wright
case, supra. The Court there unanimously upheld the second Frazier-Lemke act al-
though two of the five rights impaired by the first act were also impaired by the second.
In any event, the Radford case, holding that Congress may not favor debtors as a class
at the expense of creditors is not strictly in point, since in 77(n) Congress is classifying
only creditors.
11. 99 U. S. 235, 252-254 (1878).
12. That is, "current debts . . . shall be paid from the current receipts before [the
bondholder] has any claim on the income." Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S. 235, 252 (1878).
13. See Southern Ry. v. Ensign Manufacturing Co., 117 Fed. 417, 421 (C. C. A. 4th,
1902) ; Fitzgibbon, supra note 3, at 235, 236. In Gregg v. Metropolitan Trust Co.,
197 U. S. 183 (1905) Justice Holmes attempted to lay down a stricter test. However,
the lower courts continued their old habits.
14. See Southern Ry. v. Carnegie Steel Co., 176 U. S. 257, 285, 286 (1900) ; Lacd-a-
wanna Iron & Coal Company v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 176 U. S. 298, 316 (1900).
15. Blair v. St. Louis, H. & K. R. R., 22 Fed. 471 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1884).
16. Burnham v. Bowen, 111 U.S. 776 (1884); Virginia & Alabama Coal Co. v.
Central R. R. & Banking Co., 170 U. S. 355 (1898).
17. E.g., Citizens' Trust Co. v. National Equipment & Supply Co., 178 Ind, 167,
98 N. E. 865 (1912).
18. The difficulty in applying this test may be illustrated in the case of bondholders'
claims. While their security is based on the credit of the company and the assets of
the road, they undoubtedly made their investment with the expectation that interest
would be paid out of current income.
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nored.19 In a sense, every unsecured debt of a railroad was incurred in
reliance on its credit. Although wage claims, for example, have almost in-
variably been granted priority,20 the workman probably thinks no more about
the matter than to rely on the company for payment. Even when the test
is applied, courts are prone to beg the question by implying a reliance on
current income whenever they feel that a particular creditor should be given
priority.21 With the application of this unsatisfactory requirement so hap-
hazard in the past, its implicit circumvention by statute can cause no great
concern. By their very nature tort claims can not be subjected to this test.
The second prerequisite, that the claims originate within a reasonably brief
time prior to the appointment of the receiver, was early particularized into
the "Six Months Rule." Of the several theoretical bases suggested for this
time limit,2 none bears close scrutiny,2 3 except perhaps the simple explana-
tion that six months from the time the claim accrued is about all the time a
reasonably diligent creditor needs for collection in tie ordinary course of
business.24 In practice the rule has worked fairly well, partly for the very
reason that the courts have not applied it inflexibly, so that if special equities
are shown the rule will not bar the claim.2 5 The fact that under Section
77(n) claims arising more than six months before the receivership may ob-
19. A demand for security was a circumstance that the courts sometimes used to
defeat a claim for priority, reasoning that this proved current income was not relied
upon. See Lackawanna Iron & Coal Co. v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 176 U. S. 293,
316 (1900). Yet in Union Trust Co. v. Morrison, 125 U. S. 591, 610 (IM38), the fact
that Mforrison was given a chattel mortgage as security for his claim was used by the
courts as a reason for preferring it, since this showed he did not rely on "the personal
security of the company."
20. See Gregg v. Metropolitan Trust Company, 197 U. S. 183, 187, 189 (1905).
21. Burnham v. Bowen, 111 U. S. 776 (1884) (claims for coal allowed); Thomas Y.
Western Car Co., 149 U. S. 95 (1893) (claims for car rental disallowed, the court
implying reliance on railroad's general credit because of claimant's economic position);
Southern Ry. v. Carnegie Steel Co., 176 U. S. 257 (1900) (claims for steel rails
allowed); see Dictaphone Sales Corporation v. Powell, 77 F. (2d) 795, 793 (C. C. A.
4th, 1935).
22. See Texas Co. v. International & G. N. Ry., 237 Fed. 921, 927 (C. C. A. 5th,
1916) (supplies should be paid for while they contribute to current income, and, since
it is impossible to tell how long labor and materials do thus contribute, the courts have
set up six months as an arbitrary limit) ; Westinghouse Air Brake Co. v. Kansas City
Southern Ry., 137 Fed. 26, 40 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905) (bondholders, entitled only to net
income, may assume when their semi-annual interest payments are made that current
operating expenses have been met and not allowed to pile up to the detriment of their
security).
23. See Fordham, sipra note 1, at 278; Wham, Preferences in Railroead Reciver-
ships (1928) 23 Ir.._ L. REv. 141, 149-151.
24. See Blair v. St. Louis, H. & K. R. R., 22 Fed. 471, 474 (C. C. . D. Mo. 18M),
approved in Southern Ry. v. Carnegie Steel Co., 176 U.S. 257 at 292 (1900).
25. In a number of cases, claims arising more than six months prior to the receiver-
ship have been allowed. Hale v. Frost, 99 U. S. 389 (1878); Union Trust Co. v. Mor-
rison, 125 U. S. 591 (1888); see dissent in Crane Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 238 Fed.
693, 699 (C. C. A. 9th, 1916), citing cases. Courts applying the rule indicate clearly that
it is not an inflexible principle. See Pettibone-fullikeni Co. v. Guaranty Trust Co.,
25 F. (2d) 948, 949, 951 (C. C.A. 8th, 1928).
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tain priority should thus not prove fatal. Ordinarily, injured employees will
not be lax in enforcing their claims. In each of the two principal cases,
although the plaintiff was injured well over six months prior to the receiver-
ship the railroad, by fighting the claim up through the appellate courts, staved
off final judgment until after a receiver had been appointed. Even without
the statute the courts might have allowed the claims, using the "special
equities" loophole-since the railroad, acting in its own interest, had pre-
vented the claims from being collected when execution was possible, the six
months should not begin to run until final judgment had been handed down.20
To this extent Congress has clearly not been arbitrary in permitting by
statute what the courts themselves might have allowed. It is true that a
more serious question might arise in the unlikely event that final judgment
were obtained more than six months before the receivership without any
action being taken by the creditor. But even then the clear fiat of the legis-
lature should not be invalidated by a rule itself an instance of judicial legis-
lation, not a principle of constitutional law.
2 7
The third and most important criterion, based on the nature of the claim,
has been interpreted by a majority of the courts to mean that the receiver
should pay only such debts as he is forced to pay in order to continue operat-
ing the road.2 8 Actually this apparent harshness29 was materially lessened
in application. The more liberal decisions,30 which explicitly granted priority
to those debts "necessarily incurred" in the ordinary operation of the rail-
road, were in fact often followed by courts professing allegiance to the strict
"necessity of payment" theory. For instance, pre-receivership wage claims
and debts for supplies necessary to the running of the road were always
classified as operating expenses satisfying this requirement,3 ' and yet, in
all but the exceptional case, the railroad probably would have been able to
continue operations even if they were not paid.
3 2
26. Love v. North America Co., 229 Fed. 103 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915) (rule did not
'apply to claims of shippers for overcharges until after the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
decided the appealed freight rates) ; see Harmon v. Blackwell, 232 Fed. 440, 442 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1916).
27. See Central Trust Co. of Illinois v. Chicago, A. & N. Ry., 232 Fed. 936, 945
(N. D. Iowa 1916).
28. Miltenberger v. Logansport Ry., 106 U. S. 286 (1882); Gregg v. Metropolitan
Trust Co., 197 U. S. 183 (1905); Moore v. Donahoo, 217 Fed. 177 (C. C. A. 9th, 1914);
it re New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 92 F. (2d) 428 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
29. For the point of view that it is anomalous for courts of equity to prefer such
hold up claims see Wham, supra note 23, at 149.
30. See Love v. North American Co., 229 Fed. 103, 107 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915); Con-
tinental Trust Co. v. Bonsal Co., 72 F. (2d) 975, 980 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934). In Gregg
v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 197 U. S. 183 (1905) supra note 28, Justice Harlan, the only
justice who had been on the Court when Fosdick v. Schall was decided, was among the
three dissenters.
31. Southern Railway Co. v. Carnegie Steel Co., 176 U. S. 257 (1900); see cases
cited notes 4 and 5, supra.
32. While prereceivership claims for such monopolized supplies as electric power
might have to be paid in order to continue operation, a receiver who refused to pay
debts for coal obtained before his appointment would doubtless be able to obtain it
elsewhere. His credit would be bolstered by the fact that courts are more liberal in
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It must be admitted, nevertheless, that, with a few conspicuous e.cep-
tions,33 both state and federal courts have refused to classify tort claims,
even those of employees, as operating expenses. 34 Utilizing the "necessity of
payment" interpretation of the third requirement, it has been easy to deny
priority -n the ground that the payment of these claims is not necessary for
the operation of the road. 35 But even courts that appeared unwilling to
adopt the strict rule and leaned towards the "necessarily incurred" theory
denied priority on the ground that accidents were fortuitous and were not
indispensable costs of operating a railroad. 3
These decisions, at least with respect to employees, might well have been
to the contrary had the controlling precedents not been established before
the constitutionality of workmen's compensation legislation was settled.3r
As the early hostile attitude of the courts gave way and employees' injuries
came to be deemed a part of the cost of doing business, accidents were no
longer regarded as fortuitous but as statistically inevitable.33 With the uni-
versal acceptance of this philosophy, courts favoring the "necessarily in-
curred" line of reasoning might logically have classified the tort claims of
injured employees as operating expenses.3 Objecton that the mortgagee's
granting priority to operating claims incurred during the receivership. E.g., Bereth v.
Sparks, 51 F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931). Yet current coal claims are nearly always
allowed. Burnham v. Bowen, 111 U. S. 776 (1884); Virginia and Alabama Coal Co. v.
Central R. R. & Banking Co., 170 U. S. 355 (1898).
33. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Kansas City, IN. & X. NN. R. R., 53 Fed. 182
(C. C.D. Kan. 1892) ; In re N. Y. State Rys., 16 F. Supp. 717 (X. D. N. Y. 1936) ;
Bowen v. Hockley, 71 F. (2d) 781 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934), (1935) 44 YatX L J. 1107;
Green v. Coast Line R. R., 97 Ga. 15, 24 S. E. 814 (1895); McCullough v. Union Trac-
tion Co., 206 Ind. 585, 186 N. E. 300 (1933), (1933) 47 ILuu'. L. Rwz. 359; see Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pac. R. R., 71 Fed. 245, 248 (C. C. D. Wash. 1895).
34. See cases cited note 6 stpra; Fordham, note 1, supra, at 272.
35. Easton v. Houston & T. C. Ry., 38 Fed. 12 (C. C. E. D. Tex. 1889); In r0
New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 92 F. (2d) 428 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937). This rationale,
would not necessarily mean that 77(n) was arbitrary. The possibility that a strite
might be called unless the claims of injured employees were paid was, apparently, never
considered. In view of the strength of railroad labor, however, it is not unreasonable to
suppose that pressure by the unions could force the road to compensate its injured
employees. Cf. note 32, mnipra. But see In re New York, N. H. & H. R. R., .stpro, at 430.
36. St. Louis Trust Co. v. Riley, 70 Fed. 32 (C. C. A. 8th, 1895).
37. In Pitcairn v. Fisher, 78 F. (2d) 649 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935), the court felt itself
bound by the decisions in St. Louis Trust Co. v. Riley, 70 Fed. 32 (C. C. A. 8th, 1895)
and Veatch v. American Loan and Trust Co., 79 Fed. 471 (C. C. A. 8th, 1897). In view
of the change in judicial attitude toward the claims of injured employees that has oc-
curred since those decisions [see notes 38 and 39, infra] the court might well have
refused to follow these precedents.
38. New York Central R. R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 203 (1917) ; see New York
Central R. R. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147, 154, 165 (1917) (dissenting opinion); Pike,
Unemployinent Insurance and Wfrorkmen's Compensation (1937) 10 So. CALIF. L. RLX.
253, 265-269. Railroad employees are protected by the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, 35 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U. S. C. § 51 (1934), under which the claims in the principal
cases arose.
39. "This (the claims of injured employees) is a loss arising out of the business and,
however it may be charged up, is an expense of the operation as truly as the cost of
1938]
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security could not be benefited by the negligence causing the injury would
be no more relevant than that the railroad received no benefit from the wear
and tear which caused the need for repairs.4° The labor the employee had
performed, like the repairs, did contribute to the mortgagee's security and
all the expenses necessarily adjunct to that labor should stand on an equal
footing with wages or essential repair claims. 41
The decisions upholding 77(n) should, therefore, not be surprising. The
receivership courts themselves drove the wedge of operating expenses be-
tween the liens of the mortgagees and the assets of the road.42 Congress
can not be said to have aoted arbitrarily in deciding in favor of the "neces-
sarily incurred" theory of determining operating expenses, so , to include
the tort claims of employees. 43 Since even those courts purporting to follow
the "necessity of payment" theory did not strictly apply it,"4 but even found
ways of preferring tort claims,45 any doubts as to the constitutionality of
Section 77(n) should be clearly resolved.4G Once established, it is conceiv-
repairing broken machinery." New York Central R. R. v. White, 243 V. S. 188, 203
(1917).
"The test of the preferential equity of a claim is often held to be its consideration."
See Love v. North America Co., 229 Fed. 103, 107 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915). Since, accord-
ing to the present rationale, workmen's compensation, as well as wages, is paid to
the injured employee in return for his labor, the courts logically could have treated
claims of .the former type in the same manner as the latter. Section 77(n) covers
"claims for personal injuries to employees," the very type of claim covered by state
and federal employers' liability and workmen's compensation acts. The courts undoubt-
edly will limit this provision to the tort claims of employees incurred within the scope
of their employment.
40. See Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pac. R. R., 71 Fed. 245, 247 (C. C.
D. Wash. 1895). Nor is economic benefit to the railroad always necessary before
preference may be granted. Railroads in reorganization have paid pensions to super-
annuated employees. Chicago, M., St. P. and P. R. R. Reorganization Record, Vol. 1,
.53 (1935); Florida East Coast Ry. Receivership Record, Vol. 1, 27; see Bowen v.
Hockley, 71 F. (2d) 781, 783-786 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934).
41. Bowen v. Hockley, 71 F. (2d) 781 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934).
42. Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S. 235 (1878).
43. See Pitcairn v. Fisher, 78 F. (2d) 649, 652 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935). While denyitig
an employee's claim priority, the court intimated the situation might be remedied by
statute.
44. Virginia & Alabama Coal Co. v. Central R.R. & Banking Co., 170 U.S. 355
(1898); see Moore v. Donahoo, 217 Fed. 177, 180-185 (C. C. A. 9th, 1914). See note
32, supra.
45. American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. N. Y. Rys., Receivership Record, 10,
368-9 (S. D. N. Y. 1924); North American Co. v. St. Louis & S.F. R. R. Receiver-
ship Record, Order of March 30, 1916. Prereceivership tort claims were often settled,
Since many compromises were thus effected, and the goodwill of the company was
enhanced, the bondholders usually acquiesced. See Fordham, supra note 1, 272-275;
Fitzgibbon, supra note 3, 236, n. 25.
46. The portion of 77(n) classifying the claims of unsecured sureties on super-
sedas bonds as operating expenses was upheld in In re Chicago, R. I. and P. Ry., 90 F.
(2d) 312 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937), 113 A. L. R. 494 (1938). Before the statute such
claims were seldom preferred [Whiteley v. Central Trust Co., 76 Fed. 74 (C. C. A. 6th,
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able that the provision will have an unexpected effect on the rules of priority
in general. Since the application of (n) will indicate legislative and judicial
approval of the "necessarily incurred" line of reasoning, the tendency in the
future may be to allow all tort claims priority, in equity as well as statutory
receiverships, and, perhaps, in the case of private companies as well as public
service corporations.47
LIABILITY FOR BACK TAXES AFTER THE GERHARDT DECISION "
THE CoMMISSIONER of Internal Revenue sought to collect federal income
tax on the salaries of a construction engineer and two assistant general man-
agers in the employ of the Port of New York Authority, a bi-state corpora-
tion created by compact between New York and New Jersey for the co-or-
dination and development of the terminal and transportation facilities of the
port of New York.' Having granted certiorari, the Supreme Court held
that such income was not immune and that the tax should be collected.2
The argument of the court that the tax would not curtail an essential state
function or burden the state unduly was sound enough reason for its holding.
Yet by calling the activities of the Port Authority necessarily governmental
in character, as it might easily have done,3 the court could have provided the
basis for a contrary ruling. Metaphysical discussion of the relative merits
1896)], although a number of decsions did grant them priority. City Trust Co. v.
Sedalia Light and Traction Co., 195 Fed. 845 (%V. D. Mo. 1912).
Since a minority of the courts already granted these claims priority and since this
provision benefited the mortgagee class as a whole by strengthening their security, this
provision is not unreasonable. It wvas put in at the request of the railroads themselves
since they feared that difficulty in obtaining appeal bonds might embarrass reorganiza-
tion plans. Warner Fuller, Communication to the Ymx., LAw Joun,.-AL. April 21, 1933.
47. Bowen v. Hockley, 71 F. (2d) 781 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934) (a chemical com-
pany). But cf. In re New York, N. H. and H. R. R., 92 F. (2d) 428 (C. C. A. 2d,
1937). The court relies largely on the "necessity of payment" theory to deny priority
to a tort claim of a passenger, using that theory to distinguish Bowen v. Hockley, supra.
As the latter case was decided on the "necessarily incurred" line of reasoning, the dis-
tinction is not altogether convincing. Since the courts in both the principal cases per-
force relied on the "necessarily incurred" approach, and since the Interstate Commerce
Commission prescribes that a reserve chargeable to Operating Expenses be set up to
take care of tort claims [see McCullough v. Union Traction Co., 205 Ilnd. 535, 607,
186 N. E. 300, 302 (1933)], the courts may henceforth tend to be more liberal towards
these claims.
* Helvering v. Gerhardt, 58 Sup. Ct. 969 (1938).
1. N. Y. Laws 1921, c. 154; N. J. Laws 1921, c. 151; approved by Joint Resolution
of the Congress of the United States, 42 STAT. 174 (1921).
2. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 58 Sup. Ct. 969 (1938), petition for recharing dcnicd,
N. Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1938, p. 8, col. 1.
3. For a complete review of the authorities concluding that harbor control has
always been considered a sovereign function, see Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Ten Eyck, 76 F. (2d) 515 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); see also Sherman v. United States,
282 U. S. 25, 29 (1930).
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of the arguments would be fruitless, for it is obvious that the decision merely
reflects a general trend towards the restriction of tax immunity,4 a trend
which will no doubt continue regardless of fine-spun logical analyses. In
view of the number of people affected, the immediately pressing question
seems to be whether or not liability for back taxes accrues as a necessary
corollary to such a decision.
The strict law is clear. Since the government is not estopped by the fail-
ure to assess taxes5 or the neglect of its agents," an individual is liable for
all arrears at common law. The federal income tax law does provide a limita-
tion upon indefinite liability in that, after a return has been filed, no collection
may be enforced without assessment within three years.7 Yet exceptions to
this rule are common enough to justify a belief that in numerous cases the
period of liability would not be so limited.8
But while the law may be clear, it may also be ill-adapted to the facts. Upon
what was once considered sound legal advice, defendants in cases like the
principal one might easily have believed their salaries exempt from the fed-
eral income tax.0 Their financial affairs would have been conducted accord-
ingly, so that a situation might readily occur wherein such a large unbudgeted
4. E.g., Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214 (1934) (salary of state officer operat-
ing street railway business not immune) ; Helvering v. Therrell, 58 Sup. Ct. 539 (1938)
(salary of state officer liquidating insolvent corporations not immune); Helvering v,
Bankline Oil Co., 58 Sup. Ct. 616 (1938); Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp,,
58 Sup. Ct. 623 (1938), overruling Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501 (1922) and
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393 (1932).
5. North Carolina v. Seaboard R. R., 52 Fed. 450 (E. D. N. C. 1892); Chicago
St. P., M. & 0. Ry. v. Douglas County, 134 Wis. 197, 114 N. NV. 511 (1908); see Provi-
dence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514, 561 (U. S. 1830).
6. Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 389 (1917); State v.
Buchanan, 24 W. Va. 362 (1884).
7. 49 STAT. 1725 (1936), 26 U. S. C. § 275a (Supp. 1937). If the assessment is
made within the three year period, such tax may be collected only within six years of
the assessment. 49 STAT. 1726 (1936), 26 U. S. C. § 276c (Supp. 1937).
8. If a tentative return is filed, assessment is not barred [S. Walter Kaufman,
14 B. T. A. 602 (1928)] ; or if a space provided for net income is marked "none" [Corona
Coal & Coke Co., 11 B. T. A. 240 (1928)]; or if no return is filed. Employees Indus-
trial Loan Assn., 27 B. T. A. 945 (1933). The last holding is especially significant, for
it is probable that in many cases similar to the principal one no return would have been
filed, since the Treasury Regulations, until 1938, provided that compensation received
from a state or political subdivision was not included in gross income. See, e.g., U. S,
Treas. Reg. 96, Art. 116-2 (1936). Unless the individual had other income, no return
would have been required. 49 STAT. 1670 (1936), 26 U. S. C. § 51 (Supp. 1937).
9. Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (U. S. 1871), marked the beginning of tax immu-
nity for state officers, and the principle has been applied in many instances. E.g., Brush
v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 352 (1937) (salary of chief engineer in charge of city water
supply held exempt); Burnet v. Livezey, 48 F. (2d) 159 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931) (salary
of counsel for state public service commission exempt) ; Halsey v. Helvering, 75 F. (2d)
234 (App. D. C. 1934) (salary of engineer of a township exempt); Commissioner v.
Ten Eyck, 76 F. (2d) 515 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) (salary of chairman of the Albany Port
District Commission exempt) ; Commissioner v. Harlan, 80 F. (2d) 660 (C. C. A. 9th,
1935) (salaries of officers of the Golden Gate Bridge & Highway District exempt) ; see
note 26, infra. But cf. Metcalf v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1925).
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expense as the assessment of several years' income tax would require a de-
structive liquidation of assets. Perhaps even more probable would be the
lack of any financial reserves at all to meet the sudden contingency. It is true
that the taxpayer could probably borrow the sum necessary from a lending
agency, since he would be in most cases a government officeholder with
tenure, but this escape seems of limited feasibility. Banks do not lend as a
rule without ample security,10 which the individual might well not have, while
borrowing on anticipated salary is usually confined to the "personal loan"
companies and limited to smaller sums.1' Such companies exact a high
charge which in time could prove an inordinately heavy burden.' Under
these circumstances the conclusion seems inescapable that the immediate
collection of all tax arrears may be harsh to the point of injustice.13 Yet
serious barriers stand in the way of any conceivable method of relief.
The Treasury Department has the power to compromise, 14 or to extend
payment for,15 certain tax claims which might alleviate the hardship in some
cases. While these devices have the advantage of allowing individual treat-
ment, the numerous restrictions which surround them would seriously impair
their usefulness. 16 Furthermore, the policy followed by the Department is
to ignore the equities and to compromise only when liability is doubtful,' 7
so that the likelihood of adequate relief along this line seems slight.
A second advocated solution is the passage of a congressional act designed
to remove the burden.' 8  Such legislation might take two forms--either
the removal of all past liability, or provision for the payment of arrears in
installments. The first method would require a most carefully drawn act to
avoid loopholes by which the clever and unscrupulous could evade just taxes
10. See BRADFORD, 'MONEY AND B.NKXG (2d ea. 1935) 173; WVILuas, CAP:uIxA
AND ROBEY, COxTmPoRARY BANKING (1933) 460.
11. See Fowler, The Licensed Lender (1938) 196 A-,N.Ls 130; see also the report
of a round table conference under the auspices of the American Economic Assn. on thz
small loan business, (1931) 21 -Am. EcoN. REv. SrPP. 11.
12. See Garver, The Mathematics of Small Loans (1931) 21 A:.. Ec,:z. RE%. 693,
(1932) 22 Am. EcoN. REv. 269.
13. It may reasonably be argued, however, that no injustice would occur if only
those taxes were collected accruing subsequent to the receipt of a deficiency notice by
the taxpayer, since the latter should prevent any further action in reliance upon his
supposed immunity.
14. 15 STAT. 166 (1868), 26 U. S. C. § 1661 (1934), as aniended 1,y Pub. L. Xo.
554, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (May 27, 1938) § 815; see also 12 ST.T. 740 (1863), 31 U. S. C.
§ 194 (1934).
15. 49 STAT. 1723 (1936), 26 U. S. C. § 272j (Supp. 1937), as amended ly Pub.
L. No. 554, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (May 27, 1938) §§ 272, 816.
16. For example, an extension will not be granted upon a general statement of hard-
ship, and a sale of property at market price is not considered undue irdship. The Com-
missioner may require a bond or other security to be furnished in an amount not exceed-
ing double the deficiency. If the deficiency is determined to be the result of negligence,
no extension will be granted. U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 272-3, as amnded by, 74 T. D.
No. 3 (1938) 130.
17. 36 Ops. A7r'y GEN. (1929) 40; 38 Ops. ATry GEN. (1933) 94.
18. See TAXATION OF GOVERNmNT BONDHOLDERS AND E,iLoEES--A STcov MAs
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (1938) 84.
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and, in any case, in view of the present temper of the Congress, is a most
unlikely eventuality. An act to provide for installment payments, on the
-other hand, might meet no great opposition. By this method the government
would not be deprived of any revenue, yet the individual would presuziiably
be able to pay the back taxes out of current income. In effect, the plan would
amount to an increase in the applicable tax rate over a period of years. To
obviate the difficulty which would arise if the income should fail, the amount
of installments payable could be fixed according to the income received, and
provision could even be made for complete cessation of payments under
specified circumstances.
But since most disputed tax cases of importance are finally adjudicated by
a federal court, the need for legislative action would be largely eliminated if
relief could be afforded at the same time that liability is determined. As the
most practicable means to this end, rulings such as the Gerhardt decision
could be denied retroactive operation. The law would be laid down, yet held
to apply only in the future, removing from the taxpayer the burden of paying
the deficiency.
A court clearly has power to avoid giving its decisions retroactive effect,
although such a holding is not in harmony with the orthodox declaratory
theory of law.19 According to conventional doctrine, an overruling decision
does not change the law, but declares it as it always has been, the overruled
decisions being considered simply erroneous. Logically, a decision of a court
stating the law as it always has been must be retroactive. Inasmuch, how-
ever, as the theory is clearly unrealistic, and has been criticized by leading
writers, 20 it should offer no obstruction to the formulation of decisions to
operate only in the future. That it has not in fact been an insurmountable
barrier in the past is evidenced by the frequent decisions in state courts
which have been given "prospective" operation only. Many such decisions
have been rendered in cases where a party, in reliance upon an earlier decision
construing a statute, has entered into a contract 2 ' or changed his position in
regard to property.22 Similarly, actions that were not criminal by a prior
construction of a statute do not become so by later reversal.2 3 In at least
one instance a change in non-statutory law has been held to take effect only
in the future. 4 It is true that exclusively forward operation appears to have
19. See, e.g., 1 BL. Comm. *69-71.
20. See, e.g., Carpenter, Court Decisions and the Common Law (1917) 17 Cot, L.
REv. 593; GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (2d ed. 1921) 232, 233; see
also the dissenting opinion of Holmes, J., in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U. S.
349, 371 (1910).
21. Farrior v. New England Mortgage Security Co., 92 Ala. 176, 9 So. 532 (1801);
Thomas v. State, 76 Ohio St. 341, 81 N. E. 437 (1907) ; Hill v. Brown, 144 N. C. 117,
56 S. E. 693 (1907).
22. Haskett v. Maxey, 134 Ind. 182, 33 N. E. 358 (1893) ; Dauchey Co. v. Farney,
105 Misc. 470, 173 N. Y. Supp. 530 (Sup. Ct. 1918); Menges v. Dentler, 33 Pa. 495
(1859).
23. State v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa 513, 126 N. W. 454 (1910) ; Odom v. State, 132 Miss.
3, 95 So. 253 (1923) ; State v. Bell, 136 N. C. 674, 49 S. E. 163 (1904).




been given to decisions only where the defendant has relied upon a particu-
lar prior holding,2 and, if this limitation were to be applied in all instances,
the taxpayer could be afforded no relief in cases like the principal one, which
literally reversed no previous decision .2  But no reason appears why retro-
active effect could not be withheld where an individual had reasonably relied
upon apparently controlling precedents. Furthermore, the trend towards the
removal of tax immunity indicates the possibility that direct reversals by
the Supreme Court may soon occur, so that the rule even as now stated might
often apply.
The federal courts have not yet been confronted with the question as to
their own power to limit decisions to future operation. In the municipal
bond cases,2 7 the Supreme Court recognized that retrospective decisions may
cause injustice, and refused to give certain state court rulings such effect.
Recently it has held that for a state court to give a decision only prospective
effect was not a denial of due process, and that every state had the power
to determine what the operation of its judicial decisions should be.2 3 Since
these rulings demonstrate that the Supreme Court has in principle approved
decisions with forvard operation only, especially when necessary in order to
avoid injustice, it seems clear that the federal courts could give their rulings
exclusively prospective operation if they so desired.
The chief objection which may be offered to this type of solution to the
tax immunity problem is the difficulty of separating the well intentioned
taxpayers from the professional tax evaders. Obviously the burden of paying
a deficiency should not be lifted merely because the refractory taxpayer
thought he had found a loophole. If it were solely a question of intent, the
problem might be insoluble, but a familiar concept suggests a method of
determining the taxpayer's good faith objectively. The standard of the "rea-
25. The Solicitor-General relied on this fact in the argument on the petition for re-
hearing. See, e.g., People v. Maughs, 149 Cal. 253, 86 Pac. 18"V (1905); Jones v. Wil-
liams, 155 N. C. 179, 71 S. E. 222 (1911); Bingham v. Mfiller, 17 Ohio 445 (1848);
Harness v. 'Meyers, 143 Okla. 147, 288 Pac. 285 (1930); Kelley v. Rhoads, 7 Wyo. 237,
51 Pac. 593 (1898).
26. However, twro prior decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals had held other Port
Authority employees immune from the federal income tax, from which decisions the
government refused to appeal. Leon S. M[oisseiff, 21 B. T. A. 515 (1930); Robert Carey,
31 B. T. A. 839 (1934).
27. E.g., Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 (U. S. 1863). The Supreme Court of
Iowa had upheld the validity of an act authorizing an issue of municipal bonds. Later
the state Supreme Court overruled the former decisions, held the act invalid and the
bonds therefore worthless. The United States Supreme Court refused to follow the
overruling decision, and gave judgment for an innocent purchaser who had relied upon
the earlier decisions. Accord: Lee County v. Rogers, 7 Wall. 181 (U. S. 188) ; Douglass
v. County of Pike, 101 U. S. 677 (1879) ; Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City W, ater Co.,
177 U. S. 558 (1900).
28. Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 27 U. S. 358 (1932). The
Montana Supreme Court had given judgment for the plaintiff according to the rule as •
stated in a previous case. At the same time it declared that the prior decision ums in-
correct and would not be followed in the future. Defendant's appeal to the Supreme
Court, claiming that it should have judgment under the law as announced by the 'Mon-
tana court, was unsuccessful.
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sonable man" would provide at least a workable basis for a decision as to
whether or not the taxpayer was justified in believing his income exempt.29
It may further be noted that no matter what form of relief is thought desir-
able, whether administrative, statutory, or judicial, the problem of ascertain-
ing the bona fide character of the defendant's claim of tax immunity will
remain.
The use of decisions without retroactive effect might also be opposed on
the ground that, if there were only the chance of changing the law for the
future, parties would not go to court, for the immediate litigant would receive
no benefit, and erroneous rules would remain unchanged.30  But insofar as
the government is concerned, the business of tax collection continues indefi-
nitely, and a decision giving only forward operation to a change in the tax
law would cut off only a small amount of revenue compared with that to be
collected in following years. The chance of merely removing future immu-
nity should be a sufficient incentive to bring the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue into court.
If it be thought, however, that the use of the non-retroactive court deci-
sion involves too great a concession even to the best intentioned of tax delin-
quents, amortization of deficiency payments over a period of years appears
to be the least objectionable solution. Since the courts are accustomed to
providing for the payment of a judgment in installments at the behest of a
plaintiff in search of assets,3 1 it is at least conceivable that the same should
be done in order to avoid injustice to a defendant. However, the apparent
lack of precedent will prove a serious obstacle, despite the stated willingness
of equity courts to shape their decrees to fit the needs of the case.3 2 Of course,
the Commissioner, under his power to extend the time for payment,33 could
afford relief of this nature, and no doubt the appellate courts would not dis-
turb such an arrangement. But it seems clear that no assurance of relief
can be had without mandatory legislation. Failing such legislation, the non-
retroactive decision seems the most readily available as well as the most effec-
tive means of granting complete relief where it is needed.
29. Cf. Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objectivef (1927) 41 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 9.
30. See Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, (1924) 37 HAwv. L:
REv. 409, 426.
31. Trapp v. Brown, 91 N. J. L. 481, 107 Ati. 413 (1918); Hayward v. Hayward,
178 App. Div. 92, 164 N. Y. Supp. 877 (1st Dep't 1917). Such procedure is entirely statu-
tory, yet indicates the feasibility of the device.
32. Bowen v. Hockley, 71 F. (2d) 781 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934); Meyer v. Relf, 217
Wis. 11, 258 N. W. 391 (1935). Since the union of law and equity in federal procedure
[48 STAT. 1064 (1934), 28 U. S. C. §723c (1934)], it follows that the federal courts
would have this equity power.
33. See note 15, supra.
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REGULATION OF RAILROAD SERVICE COMPETITION*
WaTREVER uneconomic duplication exists between public utilities the rav-
ages of competition make extensive regulation necessary.1 In the railroad
field the regulation has been almost exclusively concerned with rate compe-
tition. Failure to provide adequate controls for wasteful service competition
has contributed heavily to the financial difficulties in which the railroads
now find themselves.
2
During the 1880's overexpansion of the railway web resulted in too much
equipment and trackage.3 The carriers attempted to make use of their surplus
capacity by taking traffic which could not be economically handled, and such
wasteful operation was encouraged in the reorganizations of financially dis-
tressed companies. Consequently, in many parts of the country two or more
railroads operate independently over routes between the Same terminal points.
Certain wastes result directly and inevitably, most important among them
being circuitous routing 4 and excessive empty car mileage.5 Attempts to
abandon unproductive lines have been few,0 partly because of the fear of
losing traffic at non-competing intermediate points, and partly because of
the pressure exerted by the intermediate communities.
In addition to these inevitable wastes, the railroads, in their efforts to
attract traffic from each other, have expended large sums to build superfluous
produce terminals, 7 storage and warehouse facilities,8 and have paid allow-
ances to shippers for terminal work which the carriers were under no duty
*Pooling Passenger Train Revenues and Service, 220 I.C.C. 659 (1937), supple-
mental order to 194 I. C. C. 430 (1933).
1. See CLAy, REGULATION OF PUBLIc UTILrrms (1932) 3-17; Mosurn AN CRw-
FORD, PUBLIc UTHrrY REGULATiON (1933) 1-26.
2. Both passenger and freight net revenues have fallen off. In 1929 the net revenue
from railway operations obtained from passenger traffic was $128,054,663, but by 1936
there was a deficit of $121,762,225. Freight net revenues from railway operations declined
from $1,645,309,614 in 1929 to $1,233,601,669 in 1936. During the Same years net income
dropped $732,176,570. UNITED STATES BuRau OF STATISTICS, STATISTICS OF RAMWAYS
IN THE UNITED STATES (1929) LXIV; id. (1936) S. 63, 66, 67.
3. During the 1880's railway mileage increased from 93,000 miles to 163,000
miles. First came the original demand for service, then construction of new lines, then
an unused surplus capacity which was offered at lower rates until once more a demand
was created for service. See LOCKLIN, EcoNOMICs OF TRAusI RTATIOn (1935) 144 c scq.
4. The average freight route is 11% more circuitous than if the shortest line were
taken. FEDERAL COORDINATOR OF TRA.qSPORTATION, FREIGHT TRAFuc REwRT (1935) Vol.
I, 77.
5. See FEDERAL COORDINATOR OF TRANSPORTATION, REPORT 0N FREIGHT CAR POOzUNrG
(1934) 10.
6. See Trumbower, Railroad Abandonments and Additions (1926) 34 J. oF Por.
EcoN. 37.
7. Duplication of Produce Terminals, 188 I. C. C. 323 (1932). Large sums of
money have been lost in this way. In Buffalo, the Erie and Nickel-Plate spent $6,500,000
for a produce terminal, while the New York Central spent 27,500,000 revamping its
old Buffalo terminal. The total capacity of the two is far beyond any business needs.
8. Warehousing and Storage of Property by Carriers at New York, N. Y., 19S
I. C. C. 134 (1933), 216 I. C. C. 291 (1936).
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to do.9 The duplication of limited trains, parlor car and sleeping car ac-
commodations has been costly, 10 and exorbitant amounts have been spent for
supplies, in order to encourage the supplier to ship by the buyer's lines."
Since their heavy overhead charges must be met even if no trains run, the
carriers have perforce sought any traffic which can be carried at above actual
out-of-pocket cost.12 Despite regulation of rates, ruinous service competition
flourishes unchecked until the point of actual net loss is reached.
Various solutions for the elimination of both types of waste are theoretically
available. Ownership and operation of railroad facilities by the Federal Gov-
ernment is a possibility, perhaps not too remote.' 3 A second means of escape
would be thrbugh voluntary or enforced consolidation under private owner-
ship. An attempt was made to utilize this scheme in the Transportation Act
of 1920,14 where consolidations approved by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission were exempted from the Anti-Trust Laws.", But the Act left the
valuation of the carriers for this purpose to the interminable process of the
Commission. Though this requirement was eased by the Transportation Act
of 1933,1' serious difficulties still remain. The prime prerequisite, voluntary
action by the railroads, is not forthcoming, partly because of the large sums
of cash necessary and partly because the provisions of the statute pertaining
to the retention of competition and existing routes make consolidation less
attractive. The critical attitude of the Commission towards such plans remains
a stumbling block, especially since grave doubts have been cast upon the
efficiency of these large units.17 Compulsory consolidation on the grand scale
of the so-called Prince Plan' s is not only open to the last objection, but con-
9. Terminal Services, 209 I. C. C. 11 (1935).
10. See FmEaA COORDINATOR OF TRANSPORTATION, PASSENGER TRAFFIC REPORT
(1935) 81-86.
11. In the Matter of Reciprocity in Purchasing and Routing, 188 I. C. C. 417 (1932).
Other wastes include duplicate baggage facilities, duplication of terminal services and
station operations, use of excessive power, providing prodigal buffet and diner service,
running trains at approximately the same hour between important centers, heavy ticket
office expenditures, payment of excessively high damage claims, exorbitant allowances
for the use of shipper-owned freight cars, and unnecessary yard movements. See Use
of Privately Owned Refrigerator Cars, 201 I. C. C. 323; FEDERAL CooRDNATOR or
TRANSPORTATION, PASSENGER TRAFFIC REPORT, (1935); Hearings before Committee on
Interstate Commerce on S. i58o, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) 18 et seq.
12. See JONES, PRINCIPLES OF RAILWAY TRANSPORTATION (1925) 91-95; L0omLIN,
ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORTATION (1935) 144-145.
13. For the traditional arguments pro and con, see generally JONES, PRxNcirL s or
RAILwAY TRANSPORTATION (1925) 504; MILLER, RAILWAY TRANSPORTATION (1924) 639
et seq.; THOmPsON, PUBLIc OwNERSHir OF RAILWAYS (1919); SPLAWN, GOVERNMENT
OWNERSHIP AND OPERATION OF RAILROADS (1928) 398 et seq.
14. 41 STAT. 456 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 5 (1934).
15. 41 STAT. 482 (1920)-amended by 48 STAT. 219 (1933), 49 U.S.C. §5 (15)
(1934).
16. 48 STAT. 217 (1933), 49 U. S. C. § 5 (4) (1934).
17. See FEDERAL COORDINATOR OF TRANSPORTATION, FOURTH REPORT (1936) 62 el seq,
18. The Prince Plan proposed by F. H. Prince of Boston, March 15, 1933, con-
templated the consolidation of all the carriers into seven systems. Of the three methods
discussed by the Federal Coordinator, (the others being pooling and public ownership)
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jures up political fears of an unbalanced transportation system, in which
some communities would be favored over others. Furthermore, the direct
government action necessary for the accomplishment of the plan, raises the
question of "just compensation" with its attendant litigation.
Failing the more complete solutions, the pooling of various services and
facilities becomes the most efficacious as well as the most accessible mode of
attack. A certain amount has been accomplished voluntarily along this line.10
For example, in May, 1933, the Chicago and Northwestern Railway, the
Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway, and the "Soo Line" oper-
ating the Wisconsin Central Railway made a contract whereby passenger
service between Duluth and the lake-region points on the one hand and
Chicago and Milwaukee on the other was to be pooled, and the revenues
divided on a percentage basis representing the volume of traffic then passing
over the respective lines. The agreement also provided for interchangeability
of tickets and a fixed number of trains per day, and determined the revenues
to be divided among the companies. The Interstate Commerce Commission
approved this pool 2 0 under the provisions of the Transportation Act of 1920,1
which provided that such approbation should be given only if the plan should
be found to be in the interest of better service to the public, to result in
economical operation, and not unduly to restrain competition.22 Without such
approval the statute declared pools to be illegal.
It is readily apparent that such a pooling plan would effect savings in the
amount of fuel used, wear on equipment, labor costs, ticket office expenses,
and costs for handling baggage, and more direct routing between terminal
points would be possible. The slight inconvenience of a reduced number
of trains per day 23 appears to be more than compensated by the advantages
gained, for pooling, besides making possible substantial economies 2 1 enables
the Prince Plan was the least favored. See FEDERAL COORDINATOR OF TP -..SFORTATiO:N,
FIRST REPORT (1934) Appendix 4, SEN. Doc. No. 119, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 106i.
19. See note 31, infra.
20. Pooling Passenger Train Revenues and Service, 220 I.C.C. 659 (1937), 223
I. C. C. 343 (1937), supplemental orders to 194 I. C. C. 430 (1933).
21. 41 STAT. 480 (1920), 49 U.S.C. § 5(1) (1934).
22. To include this last requirement in legislation whose main purpose was to foster
coordination rather than competition was, to say the least, incongruous. It is apparent
that a strict application of it would nullify any possible advance towards soving the
existing difficulties, and in its present setting it appears to be an anachronism.
23. If competition is to be stifled by such pools, the possibility of less efficient service
to the shipper must be faced. But the competition of other types of transportation and
the supervision of service facilities by the Commission under § 1S(a)2 of the Inter-
state Commerce Act will undoubtedly serve to keep the standards of service upon a
high level. A comparison between publicly owned or monopolistic railways and those
privately operated reveals a variety of opinion as to the efficiency of the services rendered.
See FEDERAL COORDINATOR OF TRANSPORTATION, FOREIGN EXPEI E WITr TnA- NsrORrA-
TION CONTROL.
24. It was estimated that the carriers could save 75 million dollars a year by pooling
freight cars and 50 million by amalgamating terminal services. See Fmmu. CconRzNAvrOn
OF TRANSPORTATION, REPORT ON THE EcoNomic Possn.rrms OF REGIoN-AL Coomrw-Ario-z
PROJECrS (1935) Vol. 1, ii; id. REPORT ON FREIGHT CAR POOLING (1934) 3.
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the carriers to attack the problem of uneconomic duplication in specific in-
stances without the necessity of procuring extra funds or making extensive
preparation and research. But, while the Interstate Commerce Commission's
favorable attitude is of course commendable, 25 the mere toleration of volun-
tary pools has proven an inadequate solution to the problem.
Before 1887 the railroads were themselves eager to check ruthless ratc
competition by the formation of pools, 20 but such co-operation was curtailed
by the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act2 and by court decisions
under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.28 With the gradual stabilization of rates
by the Commission after 1887, rate wars ceased, but service competition in-
creased in importance.29 Carriers became inured to the habits of competition,
and there grew up intense rivalries for competitive advantages. 0 Conse-
quently, when the Transportation Act of 1920 was enacted, and modified
the doctrine of enforced competition by allowing the railways to pool under
the restrictions set out above, competition had become the vogue of the industry.
Naturally, the successful railroads were reluctant to give up their hard-won
competitive advantage§, and even the traffic departments of weaker roads
have been unable or unwilling to depart from the pattern of competitive
behavior. Whether for these reasons or others, the use of the pooling clause
has been negligible.31
When the problem of ruthless competition became more acute with the
depression, the Emergency Transportation Act of 193332 was enacted. It
25. Two pooling devices have been denied the approval of the Commission. In the
first, one of the applicants was not a carrier, owning no lines of its own, and hence was
not capable of entering into such an agreement. Union Belt of Detroit, Pooling of
Revenues, 201 I. C. C. 577 (1934). In the other the only benefit was to go to industries
along the right of way who would not have to pay demurrage charges. Application
to Divide Demurrage Charges between the Texas & N. 0. R. R. and the St. Louis,
Southwestern Ry., 223 I. C. C. 437 (1937).
26. See Hudson, The Souther; Railway and Steamship Association (1890) 5 QUAn-
TERLY JOURNAL OF EcoNoMics 70; Newcomb, The Present Railway Situation (1997)
165 NORTH AMERICAN Rmaviw 591, 595; Riegel, The Omaha Pool (1924) 22 IOWA
JOURNAL OF HiSTORY AND POLITICS 569.
27. 24 STAT. 380 (1887). This section expressly forbids the use of pools by all
carriers subject to the Act.
28. E.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U. S. 290 (1897);
United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U. S. 505 (1898).
29. See LocKLI , EcoNomics OF TRANSPORTATION (1935) 312 et seq.
30. See Record p. 322 et seq., Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S.
197 (1904).
31. Four cases, including the principal case, apparently comprise the full use of this
section in passenger traffic. Puget Sound-Portland Joint Passenger-Train Service,
96 I. C. C. 116 (1925); Twin Cities-Head of the Lakes Joint Passenger-Train Service,
107 I. C. C. 493 (1926); Pooling Passenger-Train Revenues and Service, 201 I. C. C.
699 (1934). In freight traffic it has been used three times. Division of Traffic between
Gulf & Northern Ry. and its Connections, 74 I. C. C. 444 (1922); Joint Operation by
Northern Pacific and Soo Rys., 154 I. C. C. 279 (1929); Pooling Ore Traffic in
Wisconsin and Michigan, 201 I. C. C. 13 (1934).
32. 48 STAT. 211 (1933).
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gave a Federal Coordinator the power to make orders forcing the carriers
to pool. Such orders were to be devised by regional boards and issued by the
Coordinator if he found such action was required in the public interest to
avoid duplication of services, to control allowances and accessorial services,
and to avoid other wastes and expenses. But because of the unemployment
situation, a "labor clause" was inserted which provided that the number of
employees of a carrier on Mlay 1, 1933, should not be decreased by any
action taken under this Act.33 In accordance with the statute's mandate the
Coordinator proceeded to make a study of transportation conditions?3 His
report was transmitted with recommendations to the railroads, but they set
up the "labor clause" as an excuse for inaction.33 The carriers appeared an-
tagonistic to pooling because of their rivalries, their common hatred of col-
lectivism, and their dislike of change; labor feared unemployment; various
communities were disturbed at the prospect of a loss of some of their service
facilities; big shippers disliked curtailment of their practice of playing one
line against the other; and supply companies objected to research into the
quality of the goods sold the railroads. 30 The Coordinator, on his part, issued
only a single minor order during his three year tenure. In his last report"
to Congress, he stated that he had not had a large enough staff both to make
the surveys and to issue orders. Further he feared that such orders would
have been attacked in the courts under the "due process" clause and he
intended to test his power on a minor issue first. Finally, it seemed to him
that the labor provisions made any far-reaching economies impossible, and
that reluctant administration by the railroads would deprive an unwanted
plan of any slight value it might have. Thus, the first attempt to enforce
pooling came to nothing when the emergency title of the Act was allowed to
lapse in 1936.
Despite the fears of the Coordinator, it does not appear that an order issued
by an officer under the authority of a statute similar to the Emergency Trans-
portation Act of 1933 could be successfully challenged in the courts. An
argument might be made to the effect that such orders would result in a
forced abandonment of property without compensafion and so violate the
"due process" clause,38 but the drastic regulation of railroads already sustained
33. 48 STAT. 214 (1933). Another section of this clause provided for compensation
to employees moved from one sector to another.
34. The Coordinator divided his staff into five sections, sent out questionnaires,
collected data from many sources, made voluminous reports with suggestions and recom-
mendations. FEDERAL COORDINATOR OF TRANSPORTATIOx, FoURTH RnrrOr (1935) 49;
id. FmsT REPovr (1934) Appendix I, SEN. Doc. No. 119, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934)
40 et seq.
35. See LOcKLIN, EcoNOMcs OF TRANPoRTATiOx (1935) 262; rEDmAX. Coo.mrTo0
OF TRASPORTATION, FOURTH REPO T (1936) 52.
36. FEDERAL COORDINATOR OF TRANSPORTATO.N, FouirrH REr0 or (1936) 51-55.
37. Ibid.
38. Cf. United States v. Chicago, St. P., & P. R P., 282 U. S. 311 (1931); Chicago,
R. I. & P. Ry. v. United States, 284 U. S. 80 (1931).
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by the courts would seem to provide ample precedent.30 And an attack claim-
ing an invalid delegation of power 40 would probably be unsuccessful in view
of the Supreme Court's recently displayed toleration of policy-making admin-
istrative boards.41
Despite the experience from 1933 to 1936 a system of enforced pooling
seems essential. Of course, it is clear that pooling, however widespread it
may become, will never by itself solve the carriers' financial difficulties, nor
will it wipe out the waste and uneconomic duplication as completely as would
more drastic action. But since public ownership and large scale consolidation
still seem rather remote, pooling offers the best solution immediately avail-
able.42 And as long as the railroad managements will not cooperate by them-
selves, some coercion is inevitable.
Fundamental to the success of any plan, however, is an amendment to the
labor provisions of the Act, along the lines suggested by the Coordinator. 43
While the labor group as a whole probably would benefit from an increasing
prosperity for the railroads, railway labor will be more than reluctant to give
up the protection now enjoyed, 44 and, in view of its past success in securing
its objectives, may unfortunately be able to block any such salutary change.
It would further be clearly desirable under certain conditions that orders to
pool should be made mandatory upon the Coordinator, but it would be difficult
if not impossible to include all the likely situations in a single piece of legis-
lation. Accordingly, the task of the Coordinator will be the more delicate
and arduous, because the responsibility for issuing orders must rest squarely
on his shoulders. On the other hand, his work should progress the more
smoothly now that most of the groundwork has been laid by the extensive
surveys made by the last Coordinator 4 5 and certain economies could be ac-
39. E.g., United States v. Illinois Central R. R., 291 U.S. 457 (1933); Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm. of California, 283 U. S. 380 (1931); Norfolk
and Western Ry. v. United States, 287 U.S. 134 (1932).
40. Cf. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935); Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935).
41. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 V. S. 1
(1937); cf. United States v. Illinois Central R. R., 291 U.S. 457 (1933).
42. Cf. the report of three commissioners to the President on the railroad situation,
turned over to Congress in April, 1938. The report suggested that a Federal transporta-
tion authority be set up to eliminate waste and encourage coordination between the
carriers, that the Interstate Commerce Act be broadened to give the Commission more
power in respect to pooling and consolidation, and that railroad financial abuses be
investigated. H. R. Doc. 583, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. (1938); N. Y. Herald-Tribune,
April 12, 1938, p. 32, col. 4.
43. The Coordinator's suggestion as to labor was the enactment of a dismissal
compensation labor bill. Its provisions and aims are discussed at length in FnMnimAL
COORDINATOR OF TRANSPORTATION, REPORT ON TRANSPORTATION LE IsrArioN (1935)
98-156. For the bill, see id. Appendix IX.
44. Compare the recent refusal of the Railway Brotherhoods to take a wage cut
though it was shown that the carriers were in desperate financial straits. N. Y. Times,
September 1, 1938, p. 1, col. 3.
45. See note 34, supra.
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complished with little delay.40 Further, as orders for pooling were issued in
certain instances, other carriers might well be forced to fall into line in order
to compete with those railroads operating under pooling devices and to realize
the economies effected by them.
JURISDICTION OF SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMrMISSION OVER EXTENSION
OF MLATURITY DATE ON AN OUTSTANDING CORPORATE OBLIGTION*
IN determining whether a registration statement is required by Section 5 (a)
of the Securities Act of 19331 or whether a declaration is necessary under
Section 6(a) (1) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,2 an
essential consideration is whether there has been such an alteration in the
legal relations of the parties as to constitute a "sale" of a "security." Courts
46. FFDERAL COORDINATOR OF TRANsPORTATION, REPORT oq Eco* inc PossMIWrxIs
OF REGIONAL COORDINATION PROJECTS (1935) Vol. 2, § 14-15; FDERAL CoonDI.ZAToR OF
TRANSPORTATION, RE-PORT oN FREIGHT CAR PooLuNG (1934) 40.
* Securities and Exchange Commission v. Associated Gas and Electric Co., U. S.
Dist. Ct. S. D. N. Y., Aug. 29, 1938.
1. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), as amended by 48 STP'. 905 (1934), 15 U. S. C. §§77a-
77mm (Supp. 1936). Section 5(a) provides "Unless a registration statement is in effect
as to a security, it shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly (1) to make
use of any means or instrumentality of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or of the mails to sell or offer to buy such security through the use or medium
of any prospectus or otherwise; or (2) to carry or cause to be carried through the
mails or in interstate commerce, by any means or instruments of transportation, any
such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale."
2. 49 STAT. 803 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79 (Supp. 1936). Section 6(a) (1) provides:
"Except in accordance with a declaration effective under § 7 and with the order under
such section permitting such declaration to become effective, it shall be unlawful for any
registered holding company or subsidiary company thereof, by the use of the mails or
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or otherwise directly or indirectly
to issue or sell any security of such company." The substance of § 7 sets forth the con-
ditions which must be satisfied before the Commission may permit a declaration to tal:e
effect.
3. The Securities Act defines "sale" to include "every contract of sale or disposi-
tion of . . . a security or interest in a security, for value; . . ." §2(3).
The Public Utility Holding Co. Act employs an even more pliable definition of "sale,"
including within that term "any sale, disposition by lease, exchange or pledge, or other
disposition." §2(23).
Under § 6(a) (2) of the Holding Company Act it is necessary that a declaration be-
come effective when the issuer proposes to exercise a privilege or right to alter the
priorities, preferences, etc., of the holders of an outstanding security, even though no
sale be involved.
4. The Securities Act defines "security" as "any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit
for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas or other mineral rights, or, in
general, any interest or instrument commonly knowvn as a security, or any certificate of
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have striven to avoid exact delimitation of those terms. Securities legis-
lation is intended to assure information for the investing public,0 and loose
definitions of "security" and "sale" serve as comprehensive devices to embrace
the myriad forms of an offering wherein such disclosure seems advisable.1
A recent case places before the courts a new problem of classification that
is of far-reaching consequences: whether the "sale" of a "security" may be
expanded to include the extension of maturity date on an outstanding security
issue.
The Associated Gas and Electric Company, a public utility holding company
organized in New York, launched an unsecured 5Y2 % bond issue in Novem-
ber, 1928, maturing in ten years, of which approximately $31,000,000 was
marketed. In May, 1933, aware of its inability to retire this issue when
due, the Company began a complex rearrangement of debt capitalization,
known as the "recap plan". A variety of schemes were submitted to and
accepted by the bondholders, with the result that by January, 1938, only
$3,250,000 of the original investment certificates were still due and out-
standing. At this time all former offers by the Company were terminated,
and a letter sent to the remaining holders advising them of a new offer,
whereby twenty per cent of the principal was to be paid at once, and the
remaining eighty per cent extended to November, 1939. An alternative
proposal provided for an extension of the eighty per cent to November, 1943,
for which a bonus of two per cent cash was to be given. The extension in both
cases was to be effected by stamping on the certificate a legend incorporating
the holder's choice. The details of the alteration were handled by various
subsidiaries of Associated Gas. The Securities and Exchange Commission
moved for and obtained a temporary injunction against the parent company
and affiliates involved, on the theory that the extension represented a "sale"
of "securities" accomplished through the mails and through the channels of
interstate commerce.8
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guaranty of
or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing." § 2(1). The
definition in the Public Utility Holding Co. Act is identical. § 2(16).
5. Securities and Exchange Comm. v. Crude Oil Corp. of America, 93 F. (2d)
844 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937), aff'g, 17 F. Supp. 164 (W. D. Wis. 1936), (1937) 37 Co. L.
REV. 650; Securities and Exchange Comm. v. Wickham, 12 F. Supp. 245 (D. Minu.
1935), (1936) 36 COL. L. REv. 683, (1936) 4 GEO. WASH. L. Rvv. 156. For collection
and discussion of analagous cases, see 135 C. C. H. Securities Act Serv. 1 1610 (1937).
These cases are concerned with unusual types of investment contracts, a different prob-
lem from that with which this note deals. Their value as authority here lies in the ex-
treme liberality with which courts have construed the relevant legislative provisions.
6. §§ l(b) and 1(c) of the Public Utility Holding Co. Act specifically refer to
the protection of investors as within the policy of the Act. Though the Securities Act
nowhere actually states its purpose, the entire statute is clearly drawn with the safe-
guarding of the public as its paramount aim. For general discussion of the alms of the
two statutes see Hanna and Turlington, The Securities Act of 1933 (1933) 28 IlL. L.
REv. 482; Comment (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 468.
7. See Comment (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1076, 1079-82.
8. Securities and Exchange Comm. v. Associated Gas and Electric Co., U. S. Dist.
Ct. S. D. N. Y., Aug. 29, 1938. An appeal was argued before the Circuit Court of
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There is no practical reason for holding that existing security holders as
a class are better qualified to consider an offering than prospective investors
would be.9 If the management of a corporation chooses to clothe an issue in
secrecy, the average non-institutional holder has no means other than the
S.E.C. through which to compel information. And even were there an inde-
pendent means, he would ordinarily have neither the training nor the incentive
to avail himself of the opportunity.10 To be sure, Section 3(a) (9) of the
Securities Act" exempts exchanges with existing holders under certain speci-
fied conditions, but this merely represents a recognition by Congress that
at such times a speedy readjustment is more important to the investor than
full information.' 2 It in no sense evinces a legislative presumption that exist-
Appeals for the Second Circuit on October 14, 1938, and decision reserved. See X. Y.
Times, Oct. 15, 1938, p. 28, col. 3. The District Court considered both Securities and
Holding Company Acts at some length but based its decision entirely on the latter act
(see note 2, supra), thus eliminating consideration of § 3(a) (9) of the Securities Act.
See notes 11 and 12, infra.
9. See (1937) 46 Y.kLE L. J. 1071.
10. See Fortas, The Securities Act and Corporate Reorgani-zations (1937) 4 Lx',
& CO-Evmp. PROB. 218, 227.
11. Sec. 3(a) (9) applies to "any security e.xchanged by the issuer with its existing
security holders exclusively where no commission or other remuneration is paid or given
directly or indirectly for soliciting such exchange." In the principal case the defendant
was subject to the Holding Company Act. See note 8, supra. Therefore the injunction
could issue, regardless of whether § 3(a) (9) would have removed the extension from
the provisions of the Securities Act.
12. Sec. 3(a), in its entirety, was conceived as a means of exempting those trans-
actions and securities wherein there seemed to be no reason for requiring the full dis-
closure which the act -as aimed to assure. Throop and Lane, Some Problemns of Ercm-
tion Under the Securities Act of i93 (1937) 4 L.xw & CoxaxTmp. Pno. 89. In fie case
of § 3(a) (9), the determination that full disclosure is unnecessary has its foundation in
the belief that when all sales pressure is absent, detailed information becomes relatively
unimportant. H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) 16. Since if the exemp-
tion is claimed no commission "of any sort" may be paid, there is no danger, if the pro-
vision is strictly enforced, that this clause can be used for evasion. H. R. Rep. No. 152,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) 25. The words "commission or other remuneration" have
been construed not to include any remuneration for services incidental to the exchange
itself, i.e., legal fees, clerical expenses, etc. Throop and Lane, supra, at 102. The trans-
action is not taken out of § 3(a) (9) until active solicitation is indulged in. See 78 0co:a.
RFc. 8669 (1934). But it seems immaterial whether the remuneration for such solici-
tation is paid by the company itself, or by affiliates, or even by apparently disconnected
companies, as in the principal case. 135 C. C. H. Securities Act Serv. 2161.03. No one
presses a sale of securities unless he has a material interest in its successful culmina-
tion, and § 3(a) (9) was clearly intended to be limited to transactions where there was
no such pressure. Actually it is probably a rare occurrence when any form of exchange
is accomplished without some direct or indirect promotion. See Douglas and Dates,
Some Effects of the Securities Act Upon Investment Bankling (1933) 1 U. oF Cur. L
REv. 283, 296; Bumiller, Exemption of Securities and Transactions Under the Federal
Securities Act of z933 (1936) 10 U. oF Cix. L. REv. 125, 135. And since the burden
of proof is on the party claiming exemption to show no commission has been given
[Securities and Exchange Commission v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F. (2d) 699
(C. C. A. 9th, 1938)1, it appears highly unlikely that the scope of § 3(a) (9) will be
extended beyond the desired bounds.
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ing stockholders as a class are invulnerable to imposition."3
An "exchange" of securities is accomplished when a company issues an
altered security to its existing holders, taking in return their old certificates,
rather than cash. It has been held' 4 and is thoroughly consonant with legis-
lative intent' that an exchange is within the purview of the Securities Act. 10
Numerous states have also construed a disposition by way of exchange as
a "sale" in order to bring it within the scope of their "Blue Sky" laws.17
It is difficult to see why an extension should not be grouped in the same
category. To allow an extension to be removed from the province of the
statutory language would ignore the legislative spirit for a purely terminolo-
gical distinction. The Commission would be submerged in a quagmire of
uncertainty, and a dangerous loophole would be established for the unscrup-
ulous. All the dangers present in an exchange are likewise present in an
extension.' 8 There is the same possibility that a holder will be induced by
the glitter of future gold to sacrifice his sounder present position, There is
the same danger that highly desirable immediate liquidation will be fore-
stalled and the service of the corporation and its subsidiaries' 0 to the public
at large materially impaired.20 The effect produced by the two transactions
'is identical. It is of no importance that a technicality distinguishes the means
-of effecting them. There is no real difference if the holder turns in a certificate
and gets a new one in return, or if he gets back the old one with a changed
13. See Throop and Lane, supra note 12, at 97.
14. Securities and Exchange Comm. v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F. (2d) 099
(C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
15. Since § 3(a) (9) exempts only those exchanges where "no commission or other
remuneration" is paid there is a clear implication that all other exchanges are included
within the scope of § 5(a) of the Securities Act.
16. See Throop and Lane, supra note 12, at 99.
17. CaL. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1931) Act 3814, Ops. ATr'v GEN. (Cal.), Aug. 10,
1932, Dec. 20, 1932, Feb. 28, 1934; People v. Gillett, 243 Ill. App. 41 (1926); Marney
v. Home Royalty Ass'n of Oklahoma, 34 N. M. 632, 286 Pac. 979 (1930); Indemnity
Ins. Co. of North America v. Kircher, 47 Ohio App. 140, 191 N. E. 374 (1934). Contra:
MONT. Rxv. CODES ANN. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §§ 4026-53; Ors. Ar'r'v Gx.
(Mont.), 1931 (construing an act far stricter than the federal statutes).
18. The S. E. C. has reported a number of instances in which so-called voluntary
plans proposed by the management have promoted interests of the proponents, to the
disadvantage of the holders. S. E. C., FIRST ANNUAL REPORT (1935) 44-48. See Hear-
ing before S. E. C., In the Matter of St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. (1935). For thor-
ough discussion, see BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (2d ed., 1932) Ch. 8.
19. "Since the holding company is under constant pressure to make a return on its
own securities, its financial practices have a similar but less direct effect on the rate and
service policies of the subsidiary operating companies which are the source of its in-
come." FED. TRADE Coimt., Report on Utility Corporations, SEN. Doe. No. 92, 70th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) Pt. 72A, p. 871.
20. See Lilienthal, The RegulationI of Public Utility Holding Companies (1929) 29
COL. L. REv. 404, 412; Lowenthal, The Railroad Reorganization Act (1933) 47 HAP.V,




face value and later maturity date stamped thereon. In either case, from the
holder's viewpoint, the nature of the investment has been materially altered.
The essence of both transactions is that each party has consented, for valid
consideration, to a binding supplementary agreement, thereby incurring new
rights and duties, and extinguishing those which were previously in existence.2 1
21. The elements necessary to render an extension binding are the same as those
required in any other contract under common law. BIGmu.w, Bis. NoTEs AND CUr-%s
(3d ed. 1928) § 612. The bondholders' promise of forbearance and the company's part
payment before maturity and payment of the two per cent bonus in the case of the 1943
extension were good consideration for each other. Jaffray v. Davis, 124 N. Y. 164, 2
N. E. 351 (1891); RESTA m'EN-r, CoxNrmcrs (1932) § 76, Illus. 6. By the definition
of "sale" in the Securities Act (see note 3, supra) a security must be sold "for value." No
definition of "value" appears in the act, and-the defendants in the principal case sought
to support a highly technical argument on this ambiguity. Brief for Respondents, pp. 25-
27, Securities and Exchange Commission v. Associated Gas & Elec. Co., U. S. Dist. Ct.,
S. D. N. Y. Aug. 29, 1938. Value, however, is any consideration sufficient to suppiort
a simple contract (NEnoiABLE IxsTRmuE.xiTs L.w § 25) and, since such consideration
is present here, a loophole is averted. Even without "value," the plan would still con-
stitute a sale under the Public Utility Holding Co. Act, for its definition contains no
mention of value (See note 3, supra), and § 11 (g) of that act would likemse still h
effective. See notes 25 and 26, infra.
But a slightly altered situation could present a barrier for the literal-minded court.
If a New York corporation not subject to the Public Utility Holding Co. Act arranged
a straight extension without part payment before due date or bonus, a labored but de-
ceptively logical argument could be advanced to remove the plan from the scope of the
Securities Act.
The majority rule regards an extension as binding on the ground that the debtor's
relinquishment of its power to discontinue payment of interest by immediate payment
of principal is valid consideration for the creditor's promise of forbearance. RESrAT-
MENT, CoNTRACTS (1932) § 76, Illus. 7; Reynolds v. Barnard, 36 II. App. 218 (189) ;
Eaton v. Whitmore, 3 Kan. App. 760, 45 Pac. 450 (1896); Robinson V. Muller, 05 Ky.
179 (1867) ; Chute v. Pattee, 37 Me. 102 (1854) ; Moore v. Redding, 69 'Miss. 841, 13 So.
849 (1892) ; Wheat v. Kendall, 6 N. H. 504 (1834) ; McComb v. Kittridge, 14 Ohio 348
(1846) ; Benson v. Phipps, 87 Tex. 578, 29 S. W. 101 (1895); Nelson v. Flagg, 18
Wash. 39, 50 Pac. 571 (1897). Accord: Stallings v. Johnson, 27 Ga. 564 (1859); But
cf. Thompson v. Wynne, 127 'Miss. 773, 90 So. 482 (1922). Nevertheless the common
law of New York has steadfastly leaned in the opposite direction. Kellogg v. Olmsted. 25
N.Y. 189 (1862); Olmstead v. Latimer, 158 N.Y. 313, 53 N.E. 5 (1899) ; see N.Y.
AN-. RESTA= ENT Coxw.Rcrs (1936) § 76 (admitting nmajority rule is contra). The
theory underlying this view is that the debtor does nothing he is not already legally
bound to do. New York is supported by a small minority. Abel Y. Alexander, 45 Ind. 523
(1874); Wilson v. Powers, 130 Mass. 127 (1881); Rumberger v. Golden, 99 Pa. 34
(1881); Parsons v. Harrold, 46 W. Va. 122, 32 S. E. 1002 (1899).
A recent New York statute, which has not yet been subjected to judicial scrutiny, par-
tially remedies this situation. N. Y. Pens. PRoP. LAwv § 33(2). The statute provides
"An agreement hereafter made to change . . . any contract . . . shall not be invalid
because of the absence of consideration, provided the agreement . . . shall be in writ-
ing and signed by the party against whom it is sought to be enforced . . ." But the
unfortunately clumsy wording of the statute operates to revive the metaphysical techni-
cality of "value." For it could be urged that even if this is a binding extension con-
tract, the phrase, "because of the absence of consideration," means there is still no con-
sideration and therefore no "sale of securities for value," as the Securities Act de-
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And it is at the essence that the legislation was aimed.22
A careful reading of both Acts confirms the belief that an extension is,
in fact, a "sale" of a "new security." Section 7(c) (2) of the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935, in listing the purposes for which a security
may be issued, includes a "security issued or sold for the purpose of refunding,
extending, exchanging, or discharging an outstanding security of the declar-
ant." Here is clear proof that the framers of the act realized "extension" and
"sale" were not mutually exclusive. Another indication that an extension is
a new "security" is found in Section 3(a) (6) of the Securities Act, which
exempts from the jurisdiction of the S.E.C. securities issued by a common
carrier subject to Section 20(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act.23 The latter
provision permits the Interstate Commerce Commission to pass on the issuance
of new securities, and that body has on numerous occasions investigated ex-
tensions as within the scope of such authorization.24 Moreover, if necessary,
it seems highly probable that the plan in the principal case could be subjected
to the control of the Commission under Section 11(g) of the Public Utility
Holding Company Act, but the broad problem there raised is without the
scope of the main question with which this note is concerned.2 5 Its chief
mands. But the ambiguous wording in a federal act is not to be construed according to
the meaning given it by the statutory or common law of the separate states.
Even if such construction of "value" is adopted, however, the defendants' forced con-
ceptual reasoning fails to present a sound legal argument. The minority view that an
extension agreement has no binding effect stems from the belief that the debtor's promise
constitutes neither detriment to him nor benefit to the creditor. Therefore since the
creditor cannot be held, the entire agreement is void. But the creditor's promise to for-
bear is unenforceable only because the debtor gave nothing to support it. Had the
debtor given anything in exchange, the creditor's promise would have constituted good
consideration, and, consequently, value. The New York statute supplies the binding
element for the debtor. It in effect decrees his signature shall constitute sufficient con-
sideration in exchange for the value given by the creditor. When the debtor is a cor-
poration and the creditor a stockholder acceding to an extension proposal, it is submitted
that there is therefore "a sale of a security for value."
22. Securities and Exchange Comm. v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F. (2d) 99
(C. C. A. 9th, 1938). A new paper certificate which leaves the legal relations of the
parties unaltered is not a new security. Whitman v. Consolidated Gas, L. & P. Co. of
Baltimore, 148 Md. 90, 129 Atl. 22 (1925). Conversely, it has been held that where the
method of dividend payment or the control of fiscal policy is changed, a new security
has been issued though the old certificate remains physically the same. In re National
Lock Co., 9 F. Supp. 432 (N. D. Il. 1934).
23. 41 STAT. 494 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 20a (1934).
24. Erie R. R. Extension Contracts, 65 I. C. C. 131 (1920); Bath and Hammonds-
port R. R. Bonds, 79 I. C. C. 267 (1923) ; San Luis Central R. R. Bonds, 79 I. C. C. 737
(1923); Bonds of Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R., 124 I. C. C. 562 (1927); cl. Central
Vermont Ry. Equipment Trust, 158 I. C. C. 468 (1929).
25. Sec. 11 (g) provides "it shall be unlawful for any person to solicit or permit
the use of his or its name to solicit, by use of the mails or any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce or otherwise, any proxy, consent, authorization, power of attor-
ney, deposit or dissent in respect of any reorganization plan of a registered holding com-
pany . .. ," unless (1) the plan has been proposed by the Commission or submitted to
the Commission by a person having a "bona fide interest in such reorganization," (2)
[Vol. 48154
1938] NOTES
relevance here is to emphasize the measure of control which the Act as a
whole was intended to vest in the Commission.2 0
The only ambiguity arising in the entire problem comes from the action
taken by the Commission itself in connection with the unlisted trading priv-
ileges granted by Section 12(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2
Under authority of this Section, the S.E.C. adopted Rule J)F 22s which pro-
vided that a security admitted to unlisted trading privileges, although changed
in one of the following respects, "maturity, interest rate, and/or outstanding
aggregate principal", shall nevertheless be "deemed to be the security thereto-
fore admitted to unlisted trading privileges." The seeming contradiction
contained in that clause is quickly eliminated by resort to Congressional
intent. Section 12(f) originated as a means of providing a continued exchange
each solicitation is accompanied by a report on the plan which shall be made or approved
by the Commission, (3) each such solicitation is made in accordance with rules and
regulations adopted by the Commission.
26. The question of the breadth of the generic term, "reorganization plan, ' as used
in § 1 1(g), has not yet received judicial attention. There is no doubt that the scope of
the word "reorganization" itself has been considerably enlarged during the past twenty
years, and that in its present usage it includes a multiplicity of devices for reducing cor-
porate debt. PAY-NtE, PLAi\s OF CORPORATE R.EORGANIZATiON (1934) 1-61. Prolonged
experience has demonstrated that corporate readjustments, if carried on without judicial
or administrative sanction, possess for the investor all the hazards present in an unsuper-
vised, new issue. H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 133; 135 C. C. H. Securities
Act Serv. 1 2161 (1936) ; Comment (1936) 45 Ykat L. J. 1050. Unquestionably Congress
regarded "reorganizations" as within the control of the S. E. C. No definition of "re-
organization" is found in the text of the Act, but § 7 (c) (2) refers to "mergers, con-
solidations or other reorganizations," and mergers and consolidations are not customarily
judicial proceedings. And the attitude of the S. E. C. itself is evidenced by the Rules
and Instructions accompanying Form E-1 (For securities in reorganization under the
Securities Act). Rule 5(1) defines "reorganization' to include: (a) readjustment by
modification of the terms of securities by agreement, or (b) the exchange of securities
by the issuer thereof for others of its securities, or (c) a merger or consolidation. 135
C. C. H. Securities Act Serv. 117231 (1937).
Certainly the intricate "recap plan" devised by Associated Gas and Electric was
a reorganization at the time of its inception, and indeed it received that judicial con-
struction. Stuart v. Utility Investing Corp., 78 F. (2d) 279 (C.C.A. 3d, 1935), aff'g,
il F..Supp. 391 (E. D. Pa. 1934). Had Associated Gas registered under the Holding
Company Act in December, 1935, promptly upon its passage, the S.E.C, by bringing
suit at that time, could have acquired jurisdiction under § 11(g) over the plan as it
then existed. Whether the 1938 extension agreement standing by itself would have
represented a sufficient recapitalization to come within the provision is a matter for
conjecture. But regardless of how that problem might be decided, it would seem a
dangerous precedent to hold that in January, 1938, the S.E.C. was deprived of previous
jurisdiction by the fact that defendants, having reached the nub of their objective,
terminated all other offers and concentrated on the extension plan. Section 11(g) was
aimed at the condition of affairs which necessitated the original scheme, and that con-
dition is not necessarily alleviated because an influx of funds has temporarily camou-
flaged it.
27. 48 STAT. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §78a-77jj. (Supp. 1936).
28. Promulgated August 29, 1934, amended July 23, 1935. C. C. H Stock Exchange
Reg. Serv. 115242 (1936).
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market for holders of securities admitted to unlisted trading privileges on a
national securities exchange at the time of the passage of the Exchange Act.20
The Commission adopted Rule JF 2 in an effort to shape a limited, highly
technical provision to its intended end by preserving those privileges in a
situation where, although the security was new, the basic investment was not
enlarged. The rule does not say it "is" the same security, but that it shall
be "deemed" to be so. Viewed in this light, the inclusion of the word mnaturity
strengthens rather than weakens the argument that an extension constitutes
a new security. Rule JF 2 has a narrow scope to cover what Congress called
the "unfortunate anomoly" of unlisted trading.30
The Securities and Exchange Commission itself presaged its present posi-
tion over two years ago when the question arose as a collateral issue in
another problem. 3' The one discordant note was struck in a recent Penn-
sylvania case,32 which held the Public Utility Commission was without
authority, under the statute giving them jurisdiction over the "issuance of
securities",33 to intercede in a proposed extension agreement. Several factors
distinguish that case,34 not the least of which is a consistent tendency on the
part of the Pennsylvania courts to adopt a narrowly legalistic approach to
problems of investment control.3 5 Such an attitude, transmitted to the federal
29. H. R. Rep. No. 2601, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 2-3; C. C. H. Stock Exchange
Reg. Serv. 12190 (1936).
30. Ibid.
31. See In the Matter of the Application of Laclede Gas Light Co., 1 S. E. C. 671,
676 (1936).
32. York Rys. Co. v. Driscoll, 200 Atl. 864 (Pa. 1938), aff'q, 131 Pa. Super. 126,
198 AtI. 920 (1938), rev'g Order of Pa. Pub. Utility Comm., 21 P. U. R. (14s.) 270
(1937).
33. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 66.
34. The Pennsylvania Public Utility Law requires the Commission to register a cer-
tificate "if it shall find the issuance of securities in the amount, of the character, and for
the purpose therein proposed, is necessary or proper for the present and probable future
capital needs" of the public utility filing such securities certificate. PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, 1936) tit. 66, § 1243. This clause alone sets the statute apart from the federal
legislation. The Superior Court, citing no authorities, spoke but briefly in deciding the
extension was not a "new security," preferring to base its decision chiefly on the ground
that the refusal to register deprived the company of a "necessary and proper need,"
131 Pa. Super. 126, 198 Atl. 920 (1938). And the Pennsylvania Supreme Court con-
sidered only the constitutional issue, deciding the statute authorizing the Comnuission's
action was an invalid delegation of legislative power. 200 Atl. 864 (Pa. 1938).
35. An illustration of this severity is afforded by the harsh construction given to
the statute both before and after its amendment. See Blue Mountain Consolidated
Water Co. v. Public Service Comm., 17 P. U.R. (N.s.) 128, 189 Atl. 545 (Pa. Super,
Ct. 1937), rev'g, 15 P.U.R. (N.s.) 493 (1936); York Rys. Co. v. Driscoll, 200 Atl.
864 (Pa. 1938). In the Bh Mountain case, a corporation sought to persuade bond-
holders to accept a reduction in interest rates. The Commission claimed this was an
"issuance of securities," within the Public Service Commission Law, [PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, 1936) tit. 66, § 201] as amplified by the amendatory act of 1933, tit. 66, §§ 1,
201. The court's main interest was in the functioning of the public utility, and it showed
little concern for the welfare of investors. Though the statute was worded somewhat
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statutes herein discussed, could easily reduce them to utter ineffectuality.
An act must be interpreted to facilitate its obvious aims.30 An approach based
on a strict construction of the legislative text, rather than upon the realities
of the commercial world 37 and the pervasive spirit of the legislation, would,
in large measure, nullify the reforms which Congress sought to establish.
Even when indications point to an innocent misunderstanding on the part
of a particular defendant, courts must realize that indorsement of any potential
means of escape would open the floodgates of evasion. Once judicial approval
is stamped on such a device, the successful circumvention of the Act would
be assured in all similar situations.
ambiguously, the intent behind it was clear. Nevertheless the court relied on the "com-
mon and ordinary meaning" of the words, "issue" and "security," in determining that
a change in interest rate was not within those terms. The legislature then once again
amended the act to include within the meaning of "issuance of securities" any "change
in any term or condition of, any stock certificate, or other evidence of equitable interest
in itself, or any bond, note, trust certificate, or other evidence of indebtedness in itself."
PA. STAT. A x. (Purdon, 1937, Supp.) tit. 66, § 1241. Despite the clarity of the
statutory language, the court in the York Rys. case continued its stubborn attitude and
refused to take cognizance of legislative intent.
36. See Royal Indemnity Co. v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 165,
169 (1933).
37. Indicative that investment circles considered the extended certificates to be
"new" or "different" securities to all intents and purposes are the statistics from the
National Quotation Bureau Records for June 30, 1938. The original issue v.as quoted
at $90-$93r per $100, the 1939 certificates at $75w-$90 per $100, and the 1943 certificates
at $70-$75 per $100.
